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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last years, Governments have developed new forms of organization, 
different from the traditional procurement, for the provision of public 
services: the Public-Private Partnerships (henceforth PPPs). They have been 
used to finance the building of tool-roads, airports, sportive infrastructures, 
to provide sanitation services and to supply drinking water, and there is an 
increasing interest around the world in this new type of coordination 
between public and private sector.  
This work analyses the phenomenon of the PPPs from a theoretical point 
of view, adopting the perspective of the contract theory. Then, the evolution 
of the PPPs in the water sector is analysed, in order to understand the role of 
these new type of organizational forms for the developing of water services.  
The charter 2 clarifies definitions and key features of all forms of PPPs. 
This is necessary because of the lack of an unambiguous definition of the 
term Public-Private Partnership. Moreover, the PPPs may be arranged in a 
number of different ways. Nevertheless, all types of PPPs are characterized 
in involving public and private parties in a long-term relationship, in order 
to realize a project with a general degree of complexity, with respect both to 
the technical aspects and to the provision of financial resources. While the 
public party is involved in defining general objectives in terms of public 
interest, the private party concentrates on the operative aspects in order to 
realize the project. Moreover, both public and private parties bore part of the 
risk, considering the ability of each party to bear it.  
Though every form of PPP is characterized by the previous common 
features, some deep differences arise with respect to the traditional form of 
procurement. With a PPP, the different stages of design, building and 
operation are generally bundled to one only operator, while they are 
separately contracted out in the case of procurement. Moreover, in a PPP the 
public party specify only the general aims he desire to achieve, delegating 
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the organizational stage to the PPP, while in the traditional procurement the 
public party describes precisely the design, the project and the input to be 
provided by the private party. Finally, a PPP necessary involves a long-term 
risk sharing between public and private parties. The consequence is that, if 
only one part bears the entire risk of the project, this is not a case of PPP. 
The PPPs may be arranged in many different ways, so they may be 
classified in two broad classes. The contractual PPPs, which are regulated 
exclusively through contractual arrangements, and the institutional PPPs, 
where a third distinct entity, created and owned by both public and private 
parties, is the tool used to manage the long term relationship.   
Finally, the chapter provides the European legislative framework that 
regulates the PPPs. It is worth notice that these new organizational forms are 
in some cases not regulated by the community law. So, the PPPs were 
initially seen with a certain suspicion by the European institutions, because 
in some cases they were used to bypass the Community law on procurement 
and public contracts. In some cases, the PPPs were also used to bypass the 
budget constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. In fact, it may 
be possible that costs and investment are recorded off balance in the 
national and local governmental accountancy, so they do not influence 
deficit and debt. Nevertheless, European Commission is oriented to better 
regulating the phenomenon of PPPs, in order to stimulate the involvement 
of private parties especially through the form of the institutional PPP.  
  
The chapter three provides a survey of the economic literature on the 
phenomenon of the PPPs. Because PPPs are long-term contracts, which 
regulate the relationship between public and private parties, it is a natural 
consequence that they are analysed within the microeconomic branch of the 
contract theory. The contract theory studies the incentives of parties in 
investing in a contractual relationship or in deviating towards opportunistic 
behaviours. The understanding of such incentives is determinant in the 
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assessment of the endogenous risk, which affects the performance in terms 
of efficiency of every organizational form.   
A recent literature is developed in the last years about the PPPs, in the 
framework of two strands of the economic contract theory, well known as 
New Economics of Regulation and Incomplete Contracting Theory.  
The New Economics of Regulation refers to the Principal-Agent Theory, 
and through the introduction of participation and incentive constraints is 
able to reduce inefficiencies deriving from imperfect information. The 
strand of the Incomplete Contracting Theory deals with the problems 
deriving from the impossibility of describing all future contingencies of a 
contractual relationship, which make impossible to write a complete 
contract. The consequence is that the initial contract will be revised and 
renegotiate every time. In this case, inefficiencies are reduced through the 
correct allocation of residual control rights, which attribute contractual 
power in the stage of renegotiation and reduce the case of hold-up.  
In the chapter, we analyse the consequence of asymmetric information 
and of contractual incompleteness.  
With respect to the asymmetric information, an interesting case is the 
“inverted” asymmetric information. In fact, in a principal-agent context, in 
general the agent owns private information, used to extract an informative 
rent to the principal. Nevertheless, it may be that a local government 
(principal) is privately informed about the quality of the infrastructure that a 
potential service provider (agent) will use. In this case, a local government 
with a low quality infrastructure is most probable to involve private partners 
in the provision of the public service. On the other hand, a local government 
with a high quality infrastructure more likely chooses to keep ownership of 
the productive assets and manage them directly.  
The presence of contractual incompleteness implies many consequences. 
First, if there is a positive externality between the building stage of a facility 
and the following managing stage, it is preferable to bundle these activities 
under only one party. In this case, a role for a PPP arises. In the case of 
 6
bundling, the party is able to internalize the positive effects of the building 
stage on the managing stage, while in case of separated agents no 
investment in the building stage would have been made. Second, in presence 
of contractual incompleteness a lack of commitment of public parties arises. 
In this case, a public party in the ex post stage always extracts all surplus 
deriving from investment of public managers. The consequence is that 
public managers have no incentives to invest, and this is a source of 
inefficiency of the public sector. Finally, the presence of contractual 
incompleteness makes important the ex post parties’ contractual power, 
because it determines the division of the ex post surplus deriving from the 
renegotiation stages.   
Due to the particular feature of the PPPs, where a public party is not able 
to describe, at the date the contract is signed, the exact way to provide what 
he wants, we argue that the economic nature of a PPP is that of an 
incomplete contract. It is a general claim that, in a PPP, the public party 
specifies the output, and not the input, the final result, and not the means 
necessary to realize it. Nevertheless, this is the same feature of an 
incomplete contract, characterized by the fact that it’s impossible to describe 
all future contingencies, so the contract is revised every time during the 
relationship. The economic nature of a PPP is that of an incomplete 
contract, where the public party is not able to describe ex ante the input and 
the means necessary to realize his aims.  
 
The chapter 4 provides the analyses of the PPPs in the water sector. The 
water sector exhibits a number of industrial characteristics that create the 
need for the public intervention in the sector in order to achieve allocative 
and productive efficiency aims. In the first part of the chapter we analyses 
the special features of this sector, beginning from the infrastructure, which 
are very specific and capital intensive, and from the condition of natural 
monopoly. Then, the informational constraints are analysed, which a public 
authority  has to face in choosing its policy. In particular, the quality of the 
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existing water assets may generate an informational constraint. In fact, these 
assets may have been built and operated in the past by the municipalities. In 
this case, municipalities have acquired private knowledge about the quality 
of water infrastructure. For example, a municipality may know which of the 
existing assets should be renewed and when. The consequence is that, in the 
water sector, the public party (principal) benefits of an informational 
advantage on the service provider (agent). Then, a survey of the various 
regulation frameworks is provided, in particular of the tariff regulation. 
Finally, the features of the demand and the issue of affordability are 
analysed. 
After a survey of the empirical literature on the water sector, that does 
not provide any result that is able to suggests the most efficient 
organizational form for the provision of water services, the chapter provides 
an analyses of the water systems of the four largest European countries: 
England and Wales, France, Germany and Italy. Moreover, the analyses of 
the private multinational present in the sector is provided, of their 
contractual power, and a research, especially for the Italian case, of the more 
or less hidden links and agreements between various private operators.  
The national water systems are then compared, in order to understand the 
peculiarity of each organizational model with respect to the regulation 
framework, the ownership structure, the government levels involved and 
their contractual power, the tariff setting and the way investment are 
financed.  
Two opposite models arise. The English model of regulation by 
independent authority is based on a unique national authority, independent 
from national and local governments, which promotes a homogeneous 
regulation of the national water sector, where entirely private companies 
owns the water infrastructure. The French model of regulation by contract 
does not include any national regulator, because every duty and obligation is 
regulated by the contract signed between municipalities and water 
providers. A local dimension of regulation characterizes this model, where 
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private sector serve more than 80% of population. Germany and Italy adopt 
hybrid models. The German model is similar to the French one in the strong 
decentralization towards municipalities; on the other hand, the public party 
is the prevalent operator of the sector, leaving little room to the private 
sector. A hybrid form is present also in Italy. In this case, more room is left 
to the public-private partnership in the form of mixed capital firms. 
In the last part of the chapter, an incomplete contracting approach is used 
in analysing the role of the PPP in the development of the water sector. The 
basic assumption is that the sector is characterized by the presence of 
contractual in completeness, especially in failing a comprehensive 
description of the long-term investment plans. The problems deriving form 
the contractual incompleteness are worsened by the presence of asymmetric 
information about the quality of water infrastructure. Under this conditions, 
an comparison between the traditional fully public firms, the private 
regulated firm and the PPP in the form of the mixed capital firm is provided.  
In each case, the firm is conducted by a manager, which may exert two 
types of efforts. The first type is an effort in cost reducing activity, which 
we assume that leads to a reduction in operative costs but is accompanied by 
a reduction in the quality of the service provided. A second effort is directed 
towards a quality enhancing activity, which increases the quality of the 
water assets in the building stage of planned investment. The important 
assumption is that manager’s efforts are non-contractible, because they are 
not verifiable by a third party.  
We argue that the institutional PPPs, in the form of a mixed capital firm, 
may be able to achieve more satisfactory results than a fully public firm and 
a fully private regulated firm. In fact, a mixed capital firm devotes more 
effort than a fully public firm in the quality enhancing activity. This is 
because the presence of the private party is able to reduce or to eliminate the 
problem of expropriation of managerial effort made by the public party. On 
the other hand, in order to achieve productive efficiency, an effort in the 
cost reducing activity is made higher than a fully public firm. Nevertheless, 
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differing form a fully private firms, this activity of cost reduction is not 
exacerbated, so the activity of maintenance of assets is not cut, and the value 
of water infrastructure is not depreciated.  
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2. WHAT IS A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP? 
Despite its large diffusion, there is not an unambiguous definition of the 
term Public-Private Partnership. According to the European Parliament, a 
PPP can be described as a “long-term, contractually regulated cooperation 
between public authorities and the private sector to carry out public 
assignments, in which the requisite resources are placed under joint 
management and project risks are apportioned appropriately on the basis of 
the risk management skills of the project partners”.1  
In the economic literature, Maskin and Tirole (2006) argue that, 
“[a]lthough the variety of risk-sharing arrangements and governance 
structures makes a precise characterization difficult, a PPP is usually 
defined as a long-term development and service contract between 
government and a private partner. The government engages its partner both 
to develop the project and to operate and service it. The partner may bear 
substantial risk and even raise private finance. Its revenue derives from 
some combination of government payments and user fees”. 
We argue that, despite the various forms that can assume, the following 
features characterise all types of PPPs and differ them with respect to the 
traditional procurement: 
1. the relatively long duration of the relationship, involving cooperation 
between public and private partners on different aspects of a planned 
project; 
2. a general complexity in funding the project, involving one ore more 
private players and in some cases public funds too; 
3. the important role of the private party, who can participate at different 
stages of the project, while the public partner concentrates primarily on 
defining the objectives to be attained in terms of public interest, quality of 
services provided and pricing policy; 
                                                 
1  European Parliament, Resolution n. 2006/2043. 
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4. the distribution of risks between the public and the private player, that 
is determined case by case, according to the respective ability of the parties 
concerned to assess, control and bear this risk. 
In this framework, the cooperation between public and private parties 
may be realised through a continuum of organizational forms, with a more 
or less involvement of the private sector, and depending on the different 
allocation of contractual risk, as we will see in the following paragraph. 
 
2.1 PPPS, PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 
Traditionally, the Government operates through the tools of the procurement 
and of the regulation in order to achieve its aims. Taking the definitions of 
Laffont-Tirole (1993), we refer to procurement when a private firm supplies 
a good or a service to the Government, while we refer to regulation when a 
firm supplies goods or services to consumers on behalf of the Government. 
In the terminology of contractual theory, in the case of procurement 
principal and consumer coincide, while, in the case of regulation, principal 
(Government) and consumers (buyers) do not coincide.2  
More precisely, with procurement the Government decides to build 
infrastructure or to buy goods and services through the purchasing by 
private firms. Different is the case of regulation. In many important 
industries, direct competition among firms is unfitted, often because of 
technological considerations.3 This is the case, for example, of public 
utilities, such as gas, electricity, sanitation, telecommunication, transport 
                                                 
2 During the last decades, the economic theory of procurement and regulation has been 
heavily based on the theoretical framework or the principal-agent theory and on the 
mechanism design techniques. As we will see in the next chapter, this led to the emergence 
of a New Economics of Regulation, that criticizes the traditional paradigm of regulation in 
not considering the questions arising from imperfect information between public regulator 
and private regulated firms. The best review of these earlier contributions to the 
procurement and regulation theory is Laffont-Tirole (1993) and Armstrong-Sappington 
(2007). 
3 According to the economic theory, in presence of natural monopolies, public goods, 
externalities or imperfect information a market failure arises. In all these cases there is 
some room for public intervention in order to overcome market inefficiencies. 
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and water industries. In these cases, the Government may decide to directly 
produce these public services throughout an own public firm. Alternatively, 
with regulation, he may introduce specific rules in order to retain an 
external control over private firms operating in such industries. In these 
case, we call of “private regulated firms”, in accordance to Laffont-Tirole 
(1993).  
The authors distinguish between external and internal control of a firm. 
External control is the control of all variables that link the firm with external 
parties, such as consumers (control of prices, of quality …), competitors 
(regulation of entry, access pricing) and taxpayers (cost auditing). Internal 
control is the control of the firm’s inputs, of the productive process, of the 
managerial incentive schemes, of decisions concerning employment, level, 
location and type of investment and borrowing.  
 Internal Control External Control 
Public firm  
 
Pubblic Pubblic 
Private regulated firm 
 
Private Pubblic 
Private unregulated firm 
 
Private Private 
 
In this way, a public firm is a firm whose capital is owned by the 
Government, who retains both internal and external control. A private 
regulated firm private sector owns the capital, and retains internal control, 
while external control is in the hand of the Government. A private 
unregulated firm is subject no neither external nor internal control by the 
government.4  
In this framework, the PPPs arise as new organizational forms, which are 
often used to replace the traditional procurement in order to build 
infrastructure or to purchase goods and services. The PPPs are also used to 
replace the usual policies of intervention in the sector of public utilities, 
                                                 
4 One can argue that a private unregulated firm does not exist. In fact, all private firms are 
subject to antitrust law, to sector rules and other government decisions. Nevertheless, a 
private unregulated firm may be seen as a firm that is not subject to a personalized 
regulation, but it is subject only to the general law.  
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traditionally based on the creation of public firms or in the introduction of 
regulation of private firms. 
The PPPs may be arranged in many different ways, and they may be 
classified in two broad classes. 
 
2.2 CONTRACTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PPPS 
The various forms of PPPs may be classified into two broad classes, 
corresponding to two distinct juridical forms, which regulate the 
relationship between public and private parties. 
The first class includes the partnerships between the public and the 
private sector based solely on contractual links, which are therefore 
characterised by a purely contractual nature: the Contractual Public-Private 
Partnerships (henceforth CPPPs).  
The second class includes the partnerships involving cooperation 
between the public and the private sector arranged through a juridical 
distinct entity, which are therefore characterised by an institutional nature: 
the Institutional Public-Private Partnerships (henceforth IPPPs). The 
following figure depicts the different kind of links between public and 
private parties in the two cases. 
Contractual PPPs 
(CPPPs) 
Institutional PPPs 
(IPPPs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partnerships based solely  
on contractual links 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partnerships arranged through  
a juridical distinct entity 
Different types of PPPs  
 
Contractual  obbligations 
Public 
Private
Institutional relationships 
Public 
Mixed 
firm
Private 
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In the CPPPs, the links between private and public sector are of 
contractual nature only, the parties remaining distinct entities. In the 
traditional procurement, public goods or services are provided with the 
public sector financing and designing the project itself, contracting with a 
private firm to build the facility, and then either operating the facility in-
house or contracting out the operation to another firm. The CPPPs are 
different in that the private party may be more involved it the design, 
funding and execution, of a good or service. The CPPPs cover a variety of 
forms, the most important of which are the service contracts, the concession 
contracts and the PFI, as we will see in the next section. 
The IPPPs involve the creation of a new entity, generally in the form of a 
mixed capital firm, whose capital is held jointly by the public and the 
private partner, which is delegated for the provision of a public service or 
for the building of a facility. An IPPP can start either by creating a new 
entity held jointly by the public sector and the private sector, or by the 
private sector taking control of an existing public firm. In the European 
Union, public authorities often recur to IPPP, in particular for the provision 
of public services at local level (for example, for water supply services or 
waste collection services). The public party exercises the external control of 
the firm. Moreover, the public party retains the internal control of the firm 
together to the private partner, through the presence in the body of 
shareholders and in the decision-making bodies of the company, in order to 
monitoring the development of the project over time. In this case, we can 
define a mixed regulated firm, which we can adds to the cases identified by 
Laffont-Tirole. The following is the new table updated with this new case. 
 
 
Internal Control External Control 
Public firm  
 
Pubblic Pubblic 
Mixed regulated firm 
 
Public/Private Pubblic 
Private regulated firm 
 
Private Pubblic 
Private unregulated firm 
 
Private Private 
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2.3 THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF PPPS 
The PPPs may be arranged in many different ways, which give rise to a 
continuum of organizational forms. All these forms differ in the way they 
involve private sector in ownership, finance, operation and accountability, 
as we can see in the following table.5  
 
 Setting  Asset  Capital  Design  Operation User fee  Oversight of 
 Performance  Ownership Investment & Build  Collection  Performance 
 Standards       and Fees  
Fully Public  Public  Public  Public  Public  Public  Public  Public  
Provision         
Design and  Public  Public  Public  Private  Public  Public  Public  
Construct         
Contracts         
Service  Public  Public  Public  Public  Private  Public  Public  
Contract         
Build,  Public  Public  Private  Private  Private  Public  Public  
Operate,         
Transfer         
Concession  Public  Public  Private  Private  Private  Private  Public  
Contracts         
Private  Public  Private  Private  Private  Private  Private  Public  
Finance        
Initiative        
Mixed capital Public  Public/  Public/  Public/  Public/  Public/  Public  
Firms  Private  Private  Private  Private  Private   
Allocation of public/private responsibilities across different forms of organization. 
Source: OECD, 2000, modified by our elaboration. 
  
At the first level of the fully public provision, the public party manages 
all aspects of the provision, being the owner of the assets, providing 
funding, choosing design, building and operating the facility, and setting 
performance standards and prices.  
                                                 
5 A particular form of PPP not reported in the table is the he competitive dialogue. It may 
be useful for particularly complex contracts, when it is difficult to define the technical 
means and objectives able to supply a public service or in cases where public authority is 
objectively unable to define the legal and/or financial form of a project. In this case public 
authority may open a dialogue with the candidates in order to identify solutions able to 
meet its needs. At the end of this dialogue, the candidates submit their final tender based on 
the solutions identified in the course of the dialogue. The contracting authorities assess the 
tenders on the basis of the pre-stated award criteria. The tender who has submitted the most 
economically advantageous tender may be asked to clarify aspects of it or confirm 
commitments featuring therein, provided this will not have the effect of altering 
fundamental elements in the tender or invitation to tender, of falsifying competition or of 
leading to discrimination. 
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In the lower levels, public party reduces its involvement in favour of the 
private sector, as we can see with the white area in the table. Nevertheless, 
the public party always in each case retains the activities of setting and 
controlling performance standard and pricing policies, while private parties 
may be more or less involved in the other stages of the provision.  
In a Design and Construct Contract, private party is delegated to design 
and to build a facility. The difference with a procurement contract is that 
public authority specifies its needs and aims, but design and construction are 
left to the private firm.  
With a Service Contract, a public authority delegates operations and 
maintenance of a facility for a certain period. The public authority pays a 
predetermined fee for the service and set a performance standard to be met. 
There is no implied financial risk for the private party, which is only 
responsible for the activities of maintenance of the facility. 
In the Build/Operate/Transfer form (B.O.T.), the private partner builds a 
facility on the base of the specifications provided to by the public authority, 
operates the facility for a specified period, and then transfers the facility to 
the authority at the end of the contract. In most cases, the private party also 
provides some, or all, of the financing for the facility, so the length of the 
contract or franchise must be sufficient to enable the private partner to 
realize a reasonable return on its investment.   
In a concession contract, which usually has a long duration, the private 
party provides a service to the public, “in place of”, though under the 
control of, the public party. The private party has full responsibility for all 
capital and operational costs. In return, he receives all revenues, in so being 
residual claimant. Prices are generally set in the signed concession contract, 
together with all performance targets. Initial assets are public owned, and 
returned to the public party at the end of the contract, while the private party 
is compensated for its investment whose monetary costs have not been fully 
amortized. Nevertheless, it may be the case that contract specifies 
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supplemented subsides from the public party to the private one in addition 
the revenues deriving from the consumers.   
Under natural monopoly conditions, a concession contract of a offers 
several advantages. If allows private participation in a sector generally 
managed by public parties. A concession contract may be able to create a 
competition for the market, ensuring the most efficient operator and, in 
principle, facilitating regulatory oversights. Moreover, a concession contract 
may encourage cost efficiency, in particular when it is jointed to a price cup 
regulation or to a rate of return regulation. On the other hand, a concession 
contract includes the following disadvantages. It needs a complex contact 
design, and an adequate monitoring system, whose cost may offset the 
benefits of this organizational form. Moreover, it may be difficult that 
contract cover every future contingency, or it may be difficult to enforce the 
contract in case of contingencies unverifiable by third parties. In these cases, 
a phase of renegotiation is possible to occur during the relationship, with the 
ex post surplus shared by the parties according to their contractual power. 
Moreover, a concession contract faces the lack of incentives to invest 
toward the end of the concession period, because of the fixed term nature of 
the contracts. Finally, Government’s ability to be credible in its commitment 
to not renegotiating creates opportunities to use and abuse of renegotiation, 
raising doubts about the initial prices on which a concession is awarded.  
One of the most used forms of PPP is the Private Finance Initiative6 
(P.F.I.). It typically involves the bundling of design, building, finance and 
operation of the facility with a long period contract. The difference with a 
concession contract is that the private contractor is the owner of the facility, 
and, generally, there is a specific clause of what happens to the facility at 
the end of the contract.  
                                                 
6 The term Private Finance Initiative has been introduced by a programme of the British 
Government permitting the modernisation of the public infrastructure through recourse to 
private funding. 
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Last, but not least, a particular form of PPP arises when public and 
private parties agree in order to create a new entity, in the form of a 
corporation, owned by the two parties. This form of mixed capital firms 
permits to delegate to this third vehicle the provision of a public service, as 
we will see in the next paragraph. 
It is worth noting that in all cases, the public sector remains responsible 
for regulation and monitoring the PPP.  
Given the features characterizing the PPPs, they differ from the 
traditional procurement in that, for an infrastructure project, the different 
stages of design, building and operation are contracted out separately in the 
case of procurement, while they are generally all contracted out to the same 
entity in the case of PPPs.  
Moreover, differing from the traditional procurement, the role of the 
public party in a PPP is to specify the output, not the input, delegating to the 
private party the organisation of the provision. In other words, in a PPP the 
public party specify only the general aims he desire to achieve, delegating 
the organizational stage to the PPP, while in the traditional procurement the 
public party describes precisely the design, the project and the input to be 
provided by the private firm.  
With respect to the risk, it is worth notice that a PPP necessary involves a 
long-term risk sharing between public and private parties. In particular, the 
long-term risk sharing has to regard the service provision. When either the 
public or the private partner carries all of the risks related to the service 
provision, there would be no partnership in the current sense of the word. 
For example, contracting out the construction of an infrastructure asset to 
the private partner would not qualify as a PPP as long as the public sector 
owns the assets and carries the risks of providing the public service in 
question. Similarly, a concession agreement where the private partner owns 
and runs a facility and where the public sector carries no risk at all would 
also not be a PPP. Finally, even when all the previous criteria seem to be 
fulfilled, a long-term risk sharing may occurs if a government guarantee on 
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the private borrowing to finance the construction the infrastructure for the 
provision of the public service; after all, a guarantee implies that the public 
sector is the ultimate risk-carrier in the project. 
 
2.4 CONVENTIONAL REASONS OF PPPS 
Many factors explain the development of the PPPs in the last years. In 
general, this is a consequence of the changed role of the State in the 
economy, which moves from the role of a direct operator to the role of 
regulator and controller.7 
The main conventional arguments of the Governments in favour of PPPs 
are the following: 
1) the involvement of the private sector assures efficiency savings and 
improvements in quality standards; 
2) private partners bring expertise and professional management skills; 
3) PPPs allow the transfer of some risk from the public to the private 
sector; 
4) PPPs allow raising private finance in order to invest in infrastructure.   
However, an important factor of development of PPPs in the European 
Union is linked to the fact that the Member States face with European 
budget constraints. In particular, European Union imposes to the Member 
States the maintaining of financial requirements referred to the annual 
balance deficit and to the amount of public debt reported to the GDP, in 
respect of the Stability and Growth Pact.8 These requirements represent a 
balance constraint for the Governments in application of their economic 
                                                 
7 Economic literature increasingly makes reference to a policy which moves from 
government to governance. 
8 According to the Maastricht Treaty, the stability of the public finance of the Member 
States is considered in particular with reference to the risk of an excessive deficit. Every 
country must respect in particular two financial conditions: the ratio between budget deficit 
and gross domestic product may not exceed 3%, and the ratio between public debt and 
gross domestic product may not exceed 60%. This is in application of the “golden rule” that 
current expenses have to be financed by current revenues and debt may finance only 
investment expenses.  
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policies of public spending. It is worth notice that, in order to complain with 
the E.U. financial requirements, every Member State imposes an Internal 
Stability Pact to its local authorities, such as municipalities and other 
territorial institutions.9  
In this framework, private funding may be a means to overcome these 
budget constraints both for the central Government and for the local 
authorities. In fact, costs and investments of PPPs are often recorded off 
balance in the governmental accountancy, and do not impact on the 
government deficit and debt. In particular, the organizational forms of PFI 
and of IPPP permit to shift costs and investment from the public 
bookkeeping to a third entity, which may be not consolidated in the balance 
of the State.  
On this point, in order to avoid the recourse of the Member States to 
PPPs only to take advantage of the benefits of the off balance accountancy, 
Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Communities, has taken the 
decision STAT/04/18 on the 11th of February 2004. According to Eurostat, 
the assets involved in a PPP should be classified as non-government assets, 
and therefore recorded off balance, only if both of the following conditions 
are met: 1) the private partner bears the construction risk, and 2) the private 
partner bears at least one of either availability or demand risk.  
In this framework, one could observe that the various forms of PPPs may 
represent a way to provide infrastructure without weighting on the public 
balance.  
Nevertheless, this is a wrong way to see the phenomenon. The recourse 
to PPPs cannot be presented as a simple solution to provide private funding 
for a public sector facing budget constraints. For each project, it is necessary 
                                                 
9 In Italy, since its introduction in 1998, the Internal Stability Pact has been subject to 
substantial changes almost annually. However, the principles of the Internal Stability Pact 
are significantly different from the rules of the E.U. Stability Pact. In fact, the main 
obligation of local authorities is not based on an expense/GDP ratio but on a simple 
limitation of public expenditure. It is essentially a prohibition of expenditure exceeding 
certain thresholds.  
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to assess whether the partnership option offers real value added compared 
with other options, such as the conclusion of a more traditional contract. A 
PPP may deliver efficiency gains and service improvement, but these 
benefits may also involve substantial hidden costs. Moreover, PPPs involve 
long term relationships, and it is possible that short term benefits may be 
outweighed by a number of long term problems. According to Flinders 
(2004), due to the long term duration of a PPP, the risk is the possibility of a 
“Faustian bargain”, referring to a deal made for a short term gain with great 
costs in the long terms.   
In conclusion, the presence of a particular budget constraint on public 
spending may be a strong incentive in the creation of PPPs even when they 
do not yield any microeconomic efficiency gain.  
 
2.5 THE EUROPEAN LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The large diffusion of the PPPs over the past decade in many Member 
States of the European Union, the lack of a juridical definition applicable 
throughout the Union and the lack of specific provisions in current 
Community law able to cover all the different forms of PPP induced the 
Commission of the European Communities to present the “Green Paper on 
Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Contracts and 
Concessions” (Brussels, 30.4.2004, COM 2004-327). The aim of the Green 
Paper was to analyze the phenomenon of PPPs with regard to Community 
law on public procurement and concessions. 
The Green Paper does not enter in a value judgement regarding the 
decision to externalise public services or not, which remains a competence 
of national and local public authorities. The aim of the Green Paper is to 
analyse the extent to which Community rules apply to the phase of selection 
of the private partner in the different forms of PPPs. In this framework, the 
Green Paper offers a contribution in clarifying definitions and terms.  
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The European legislative framework governing the choice of private 
partner for any project involving the award of tasks to a third party is 
governed by a minimum base of principles deriving from Articles 43 to 49 
of the EC Treaty, which are the principles of transparency, equality of 
treatment, proportionality and mutual recognition.  
More detailed rules cover some forms of CPPPs in order to protect the 
interests of traders established in a Member State who wish to offer goods 
or services to contracting authorities established in another Member State. 
The aim is to avoid both the risk of preference towards national tenders and 
the possibility that public choices may be guided by considerations other 
than economic ones. 
 In the case of the concession contracts, the “Interpretative 
Communication on concessions under Community law” (Official Journal of 
the European Union, n. C121, 29 April 2000) defines the outlines of the 
concept of concession and the obligations incumbent on the public 
authorities when selecting the economic operators to whom the concessions 
are granted, in order to facilitate conditions of effective competition 
between private parties and legal clarity. 
Moreover, the new Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC introduce 
new rules in order to coordinate the procedures for the award of public 
contracts or concessions, and the new procedure called “competitive 
dialogue”. 
After the debate on the Green Paper, the “Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Procurement 
and Concessions” (COM 2005/569, 15.11.2005) confirms that the most part 
of PPPs, especially the CPPPs, are covered by the Community Law on 
public contracts and concessions. On the other hand, the Commission  finds 
a high demand of operators for a greater legal certainty in the European 
rules concerning concessions and the IPPPs. In fact, the IPPPs are often 
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cases of the European Court of Justice (henceforth ECJ) and uncertainty is 
spread among operators.  
According to the Commission, the private partner of such IPPPs must be 
selected in a transparent way and without discrimination, in order to respect 
the procurement directives or the EC Treaty. The question arises when a 
public authority assigns to a IPPP, with a mixed public/private firm, a public 
contract or a concession: is in this case necessary a tendering procedure in 
respect of the procurement directives of the European Community? Here the 
judgments of the ECJ in the Teckal and Stadt Halle cases (C-107/98 and C-
26/03) have laid down the determining criteria.  
Under the Stadt Halle case law, the ECJ states that the participation of 
the awarding authority in the mixed capital undertaking does not justify 
exemption from the principles of procurement law. An exemption from 
procurement law is recognised only in the case of “in house” enterprise. It is 
the case when the awarding authority exercises over the undertaking 
enterprise a control similar to that which it exercises over its own 
departments and when the enterprise essentially acts only for the public 
body. The two criteria must be cumulatively fulfilled to ensure that there is 
equivalence with internal departments of the contracting authority. 
Moreover, according to the Court, the contracting authority exercises a 
control as it would over its own departments only when it  hold 100 % of 
the undertaking’s capital, in other words when there is no private 
shareholders involvement. This judgment is based on the fact that awarding 
a public contract to a mixed-economy enterprise without a tendering 
procedure would damage the aim of undistorted competition and the 
principle of equality of treatment of parties. In fact, the absence of a 
tendering procedure would give to the private participating in the capital of 
the mixed-economy enterprise an advantage over its competitors.  
The ECJ confirmed his judgement in the Teckal case (case C-107/98, 
Teckal, Judgment of 18 November 1999). 
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On the other hand, recently, with the ANAV case (case C-410/04), the 
orientation of the Court is that it is not only the actual participation of a 
private party in the capital of a publicly owned company that excludes the 
in-house status of a publicly owned company, but also a contracting entity's 
intent to open up the capital of its daughter company to private third parties 
in the future. Thus, public contracts or concessions could not be awarded 
"in-house" to publicly owned companies the capital of which is intended to 
be opened to private parties in the course of the performance of the 
respective public contracts or concessions. 
At this point the orientation of the ECJ seemed to be diffident towards 
the model of IPPPs. In fact, there was no possibility for a public authority to 
create an IPPP without contrasting the orientation of the ECJ. It seemed that 
this fact signed the end of the model of IPPPs.10  
In this framework of great legal uncertainty, at the end of 2006 the 
“European Parliament Resolution on public-private partnerships and 
Community law on public procurement and concessions” (2006/2043) 
supports the Commission’s efforts to take action in the field of 
Institutionalised PPPs (IPPPs). In view of the proliferating case law, the 
European Parliament emphasizes the widespread legal uncertainty in the 
application of in-house criteria and therefore calls on the Commission to 
devise criteria, based on the current case law of the ECJ, that establish a 
stable frame of reference for local authority decision-making.  
In response to the European Parliament claim of a stable frame and legal 
certainty, in date 05.02.2008 the European Commission issued the 
“Interpretative Communication on the application of Community law on 
Public Procurement and Concessions to Institutionalised Public-Private 
Partnerships (IPPP)” (C, 2007, 6661). According to European Commission, 
the perceived lack of legal certainty in relation to the involvement of private 
partners for IPPP may undermine the success of such projects, and may 
                                                 
10 On this point, Chiti (2005) is a critic work on the orientation of the ECJ, and foresaw the 
end of the model of the IPPPs for the management of public local services.  
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discourage public authorities and private parties from entering into IPPP at 
all. 
This Communication sheds light on the Commission's understanding of 
how the Community laws have to be applied in the case of IPPPs.  
First, Commission states that simple capital injections made by private 
investors into publicly owned companies do not constitute an IPPP. In fact, 
the private participation to the IPPP consists both in the contribution of 
capital and in the active participation in the operation and management of 
the contracts awarded to the public-private entity. 
An IPPP is usually set up in two ways. The first way is by founding a 
new company, the capital of which is held jointly by the contracting entity 
and the private partner and awarding a public contract or a concession to 
this newly founded public-private entity. The second way is the 
participation of a private partner in an existing publicly owned company 
which has obtained public contracts or concessions "in-house" in the past. In 
any case, the Commission does not consider a double tendering procedure 
— one for selecting the private partner to the IPPP and another one for 
awarding public contracts or concessions to the public-private entity — to 
be practical. 
According to the Commission, one possible way of setting up an IPPP, 
which is compatible with the principles of Community law while at the 
same time avoiding a double tendering procedure, is as follows. The private 
partner of the IPPP is selected by means of a procedure, the subject of which 
is both the public contract which is to be awarded to the future public-
private entity, and the private partner's operational and managerial 
contribution to perform the task of the public-private entity. The selection of 
the private partner is accompanied by the founding of the IPPP and the 
award of the contract the public-private entity. 
The principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination imply an 
obligation of transparency, which consists in ensuring basic information on 
the following points: the public contracts to be awarded to the future public-
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private entity, the statutes and articles of association, the shareholder 
agreement and all other elements governing the contractual relationship 
between the contracting entity and the private partner on the one hand, and 
the contracting entity and the future public-private entity on the other hand. 
Information should include the duration of the public contract, the optional 
renewals or modifications of the initial public contract. 
Moreover, the contract between the public authority and the private 
partner should determine a detailed procedure in order to assure a new 
tender at the end of the contract.  
Finally, after the IPPP is founded and the contract is signed, the IPPP 
must remain within the scope of their initial object and can as a matter of 
principle not obtain any further public contracts or concessions without a 
procedure respecting Community law on public contracts and concessions.  
However, as the IPPP is usually set up to provide a service over a long 
period, it must be able to adjust to certain changes in the economic, legal or 
technical environment. Community provisions on public procurement and 
concessions do not rule out the possibility of taking into account these 
developments as long as the principles of equal treatment and transparency 
are respected. Thus, it is required that the tender expressly provides for this 
possibility, and for the relevant detailed rules, in order to define the 
framework within which the procedure must be carried out.  
In this way, European Commission solved the legal feasibility of the 
model of IPPPs, opening to it for the future economic political choices by 
the E.U. Member States. 
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3. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE 
ECONOMIC THEORY 
In the previous section, we have analysed the different forms of PPPs, and 
their features. We have seen that they represent a new form of public sector 
intervention in the economy. In this respect, the analysis of PPPs fits in the 
more general issue of delineating the optimal division of labour between the 
public and the private spheres. Theoretical analyses should highlight 
benefits and costs of PPPs, as compared to the other traditional forms of 
public intervention in the economy. In particular, this analysis should 
outline the conditions under which contractual or institutional PPPs may be 
the optimal organization form compared to the traditional procurement or to 
the simple market regulation.  
In the previous chapter, we have seen that a recurrent justification of a 
PPP in building and managing a public facility is the possibility of reducing 
public spending (and distorsive taxation11) throughout a supposed cheaper 
private funding. The implication of this claim is that the provider should 
finance all the initial cost of investment and that no public subside should be 
allowed, with private partner boring the most part of financial risk. 
Nevertheless, private financing do not seem to be an important justification 
for PPPs. In fact, according to the economic theory, the optimal risk sharing 
implies that it is efficient for the less risk-averse parties to take a bigger 
proportion of the risk. According to this view, the government should be 
less risk averse than private operators, because of its large diversification 
and because of its power to impose taxes. The consequence should be that 
for large size projects which imply large risks, a PPP should be less efficient 
                                                 
11 The theory of public finance shows that taxation generates a loss in the net welfare, 
which is born by consumers or firms depending on the elasticity of demand and supply 
functions. The only way taxation does not create distortion is trough lump sum transfers, 
nevertheless this way is difficult to realize.  
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then the traditional public provision. In fact, one should expect the private 
provider to demand a higher remuneration from the government for having 
to bear high risks. Moreover, private contractors will face less favourable 
financing conditions in capital markets because they have a higher default 
probability than the government, which benefits from its ability to tax.12  
According to Engel-Fischer-Galetovic (2006), the only argument of 
private funding is not able to justify a PPP. The authors show that, in 
financing a facility to provide a public service, user fees paid directly to the 
provider and government subsidies are perfect substitutes. In fact, the public 
sector may use subsidies to finance a franchise, but in this case the 
government has to collect taxes and increase public spending, incurring in 
the shadow cost of taxation. On the other hand, also if the user fees are able 
to cover the entire cost of the initial investment, and no subsidies are 
necessary, an opportunity cost arises, deriving from the renunciation of the 
government to these future revenues in favour of the franchise. In fact, these 
revenues could have been used to reduce general taxation and its distortions.  
The authors state that a PPP should be preferred to a traditional public 
provision only under the exogenous assumption that the PPP is productively 
more efficient in building and managing the infrastructure whit respect to 
the public sector. 
                                                 
12 A further cost of risk delegation is the presence of informational problems. Classical 
agency theory shows the relationship between risk sharing and incentives in optimal 
contracting. The problem comes from the difficulty of disentangling exogenous risk from 
endogenous risk, that is, what the contractor can influence through his action. The theory 
assumes that the outcome delivered by the agent, in terms of cost and quality for example, 
is a random variable, but with its distribution being a function of the effort exerted by the 
agent itself. In this way, the theory focuses on the trade-off between risk sharing and 
incentive provision. At the date of the contract, the government has to trade off risk-sharing 
and incentive-provision considerations. Indeed, as effort is not contractible, passing on no 
risk to the contractor will lead to zero effort. At the other extreme, delegating to the 
contractor the whole risk induces him to fully internalise the benefits of his efforts since he 
is the residual claimant of these benefits. But, so making, the government will have to pay a 
high risk premium if the contractor is very risk averse. The optimum is to find a middle 
ground, where the degree of risk sharing is such that the marginal loss incurred by shifting 
risk from the government to the contractor equals the marginal gain from increased effort 
by the contractor. 
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In this case, the contract has to trade-off  optimally the following 
variables: the opportunity cost of the user fees, the shadow cost of taxation 
which need to finance public subsidies, the allocation of risk demand. The 
last variable concerns the risk deriving from uncertain demand of the users 
of the infrastructure, so the question of which party bears the risk of the 
project is relevant for the design of the contract. In this case, according to 
Engel-Fischer-Galetovic, optimal contracts have to design the duration and 
the amount of public transfers (subsidies). Assuming a risk neutral 
government and a risk averse private partner, these contracts may be 
classified into three large groups, depending on the size of the up-front 
investment and on the uncertainty of the demand.  
The first group includes small projects, where the small size of the initial 
investment is entirely covered by user fees in all states of demand. In this 
case, there is no demand risk, and the franchise obtains full insurance 
against risk. The optimal contract does not allow for subsidies because the 
franchise is full insured, and the duration is finite and short, in order to 
reduce opportunity costs deriving from a direct management of the revenues 
by the government.  
On the opposite side, there is the group of the large projects, with a large 
up front investment and where user fees are not able to finance entirely the 
project in any state of demand. In this case, due to the risk aversion of the 
franchise, the government has to pay subsidies in every state of demand, and 
it incurs in public spending and in distortionary taxation. In order to 
minimize subsidies and their negative effects of tax distortion, the duration 
of the contract is long or indefinite. Again the franchise is fully insured, 
because a minimum subside and a long duration of the contract permit to 
cover the initial investment.  
The intermediate size projects belong to the third group, where it can 
occur that demand of users may be high or low, and it respectively covers or 
not the initial investment. In this case, the terms of the contract are 
contingent to the state of demand. In case of low demand state, due to risk 
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aversion of the franchise, the government pay a subside in order to cover the 
initial investment, but the duration is long enough. In case of high demand 
state, user fees are able to cover the initial investment, and no subsidies are 
provided, and the duration of the contract is short.  
 
3.1 A CONTRACTUAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSES OF PPPS 
The contribution of Engel-Fischer-Galetovic is important in clarifying the 
financial side of PPPs and the link with public transfers. Nevertheless, the 
authors are not convincing in assuming an exogenous way in the choice of a 
PPP, referring to its higher productivity with respect to the traditional 
procurement. In fact, the authors assume as given the fact that a PPP is more 
efficient, from a productive point of view, than a traditional procurement. 
Nevertheless, they do not explain the reason of this larger efficiency. It 
would be more satisfactory to explain the differences between the various 
organizational forms in an endogenous way. In so making, a difference in 
productive efficiency would be explained considering the different 
incentives that contractual parties have in achieving efficient results.   
According to the traditional economic literature, the need of a public 
intervention in the economy arises in presence of a market failure. A market 
failure occurs when market competition, through the price mechanism, is 
not able to coordinate economic agents and to achieve the maximum social 
welfare. According to the economic theory, a market failure occurs in case 
of natural monopoly, of public goods, of externalities and of imperfect 
information between agents. Nevertheless, the net benefit of the public 
intervention depends both on the ability to alleviate inefficiencies deriving 
from the market failures and on the costs of this intervention.  
In this framework, to make sense from an economic perspective, a PPP 
should have an economic justification for the involvement of both public 
and private sector, in order to achieve social welfare efficiency.  
 31
At this point, a definition of social welfare occurs. According to the 
economic literature, social welfare deals with two efficiency arguments 
commonly used in the economic analysis. The first argument deals with 
productive efficiency, which concerns with the ability in producing at 
minimum costs. The second argument deals with allocative efficiency, 
which concerns with the ability to choose a socially efficient production 
level, in order to maximize an aggregate utility function. In a Pareto-sense, a 
distribution of resources is allocative efficient when it is impossible to make 
some agents better off without making others worse off. Together, allocative 
and productive efficiency determine social welfare.   
In this framework, the rational for public sector involvement in a PPP 
deals with the presence of a market failure and the need to increase 
allocative efficiency. In this respect, the reason of the public sector in a PPP 
is not different from the traditional public intervention. In addition, the 
private sector involvement deals with productive efficiency, and its role 
should be to add value to a PPP in order to make it more convenient than a 
traditional form of intervention.  
According to this view, every organisational form determines a second 
best solution, because of a trade off between productive and allocative 
efficiency.  
The analyses of the trade off between allocative and productive 
efficiency is relevant in the assessment of the more socially preferable 
organization form for the project. In this framework, the financing and 
development of a large project involves a variety of economic and political 
parties, and the success of this project depends on the efforts and 
investments of these parties. The risk assessment of the project and of the 
way in which it is organised may not be only based on purely exogenous 
considerations. An endogenous risk has to be considered in order to explain 
the differences between the different forms of organisation. This 
endogenous risk is influenced by the contractual terms, which may induce 
the parties to under-perform.  
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In this framework, a contractual approach permits to understand the 
endogenous risk deriving from the economic agents incentive’ to deviate 
towards opportunistic behaviours. A contractual approach is able to analyse 
the optimal design and risk sharing in a PPP. 
The study of this endogenous risk and the consequent trade off between 
productive and allocative efficiency is the objective of two strands of the 
economic contract theory, well known as New Economics of Regulation and 
Incomplete Contracting Theory.  
 
3.1.1 The New Economics of Regulation 
The New Economics of Regulation is associated in particular with the work 
of Laffont and Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and 
Regulation. They critique the traditional paradigms of regulation in not 
considering the lack of information of the regulator towards the regulated 
firm. According to this theory, the regulation problem is essentially a 
control problem under incomplete information. The framework is a 
principal-agent set up in which the principal is the Government or the 
regulatory institution and the agent is the regulated firm. Through the 
techniques of the Mechanism Design, the principal maximizes social 
welfare under incentive constraints that result from the informational 
advantage of the agent and its strategic (opportunistic) behaviour. This 
advantage has two components. The first is that the firm is better informed 
about itself than the regulator; the firm has thus information that is hidden 
from the regulator. In this case of adverse selection, the firm has more 
information than the regulator about some exogenous variables. The firm’s 
informational advantage may be referred to the production costs or to the 
demand curve, in a procurement and in a regulation context, respectively. 
The second informational advantage is that the firm knows its actions but 
the regulator does not; in other words, the firm can take actions that are 
hidden from the regulator. This case of moral hazard refers to endogenous 
variables that are not observed by the regulators. The firm takes 
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discretionary actions, called effort, that affect its cost or the quality of the 
service provided. In this case, the firm may opportunistically reduce its 
effort in order to maximize its utility function. Effort may be the intensity or 
the number of hours of the manager’s labour. However, it may be 
interpreted more broadly. Some examples of negative effort are the 
manager’s allocation of benefits, attention to career rather than to efficiency, 
purchase of materials at high prices.  
Most effects of adverse selection and moral hazard do not compare in 
accounting statements and are neither observable by the regulator nor 
verifiable by a third party, like as a court. This informational advantage 
allows the firm to extract a rent from the regulator. The New Economics of 
Regulation stresses the trade-off between productive efficiency and rent 
extraction when the regulated firm has such an informational advantage.   
 
3.1.2 The Incomplete Contracting Theory 
The other strand of literature relevant for the analysis of contract design and 
risk transfer in PPPs is the Incomplete Contracting Theory. The origin of the 
notion of contractual incompleteness dates back to the papers of Grossman-
Hart (1986), Hart-Moore (1990) and Hart (1995). All these contributions 
share the idea that contracts are necessarily incomplete, because it is 
impossible to describe ex ante all aspects of the future trade due to uncertain 
future. In other words, contracts are incomplete because it would be too 
costly to write a comprehensive contract, in the sense that it will specify all 
parties’ obligations in all future states of the world, to the fullest extent 
possible.  
Contractual incompleteness is crucial if parties have to undertake 
relationship-specific investment. Due to contractual incompleteness, the 
parties have to leave future outcomes open to future renegotiation, and the 
contract is ex post renegotiated all the time during the relationship. Such 
renegotiation influences the incentives to undertake ex ante relationship-
specific investments. The assumption of relationship-specific investment is 
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crucial because the ex post contracting costs become prohibitively high due 
to the ex post absence of competition deriving from the specific 
relationship.  
In this context, according the New Property Rights approach (henceforth, 
NPR), the ‘correct’ allocation of property rights, in determining the 
bargaining parties’ power in the ex post determination of the terms of trade, 
protects the holders of property rights against the expropriation of the 
benefits of their specific investment and thus increases their incentive to 
invest. In other words the ownership of physical or non human assets 
matters because ownership is a source of power when contracts are 
incomplete. In fact, given that a contract will not specify all aspects of asset 
usage in every contingency, it is the owner of the asset in question who has 
the right to decide all usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent with a 
prior contract, custom, or law. In fact, possession of residual control rights 
is taken virtually to be the definition of ownership. 
Contractual incompleteness is strictly linked to the assumption of 
nonverifiability. It is possible that contractual parties cannot write ex ante a 
contract contingent on the state of nature, because this state is not verifiable 
by a third party that could enforce the contract. The presence of 
nonverifiability makes also relevant the allocation of residual control rights. 
In fact, under some conditions, the expropriation of the relationship-specific 
investment could be avoided regardless of the structure of ownership 
through both ex ante profit-sharing agreement and investment expenditure 
sharing agreement. However, these agreements may be insufficient to 
encourage ex ante relationship-specific investment because profits or 
investment may be unverifiable. In the first case one party could inflate 
costs and claim that profits are low, and in the second case may be difficult 
to describe or verify the investment, and it is impossible for a third party to 
enforce the contract. Consequently, the correct allocation of residual control 
rights becomes a relevant device in order to encourage relationship-specific 
investments. 
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It is worth notice that both the New Economics of Regulation and the 
Incomplete Contracting Theory recognise that the presence of a public 
authority (government, regulator agency…) as a contractual party implies 
some peculiar effects that are not present in a pure private relationship. In 
fact, with the presence of a public partner two problems arise. First, the 
problem of determine its utility function: is the public partner interested in 
maximizing social welfare or own egoistic goals? The second problem is the 
lack of commitment of a public partner. In fact, a government or any other 
public authority is not able to commit not to expropriate ex post the private 
parties’ investment in order to maximize his utility function, due to the fact 
that private efforts and their benefits are non contractible.  
Concluding, both the New Economics of Regulation and the Incomplete 
Contracting Theory provide important lessons for the analysis of contract 
design in the PPPs. First, when information is asymmetric, the regulator 
faces a trade off between rent extraction and productive efficiency. Second, 
as contracts are incomplete, there is a trade-off between ex post decisions 
rights and ex ante effort choices, implying that if economic agents have ex 
post decisions rights, they will exert greater efforts ex ante. Third, public 
owners of an asset cannot commit not to expropriate the returns of private 
parties’ efforts (managers or shareholders). Fourth, the type of contracts 
modifies project returns or their distribution and, thus, impacts on 
endogenous project risks. 
 In the next paragraph a survey of the economic literature that analyses 
the questions arising with the PPPs is provided, referring to the New 
Economics of Regulation and the Incomplete Contracting Theory. 
 
3.2 INSIGHTS FROM THE N.E.R. 
Within the literature of the incentive theory, in the framework of the 
principal agent modelling, we have seen that the NER critics the traditional 
analyses of procurement and regulation. In fact, in not considering 
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informational problems, the traditional theory largely ignored incentive 
issues.  
The most part of the literature of the NER deals with the optimal design 
of incentive contracts between government and private firms under 
conditions of adverse selection and moral hazard. Nevertheless, some work 
highlights the effects of informational problems on the organizational form 
of PPPs, compared with the traditional procurement.  
 
3.2.1 Building and managing facilities: the effects of bundling under 
asymmetric information 
One of the key features of a PPP is that the stages of building and managing 
of a public facility are bundled in one single provider. A recent literature 
analyses the conditions under which the bundling is preferable, and, as a 
consequence, if a PPP is desirable with respect to a traditional form of 
procurement.  
The principal agent approach focuses on the role of asymmetric 
information and analyses how informational rents and incentives change if 
building and managing are bundled or unbundled.  
In order to understand under which circumstances bundling or 
unbundling (and so PPP or traditional procurement) are optimal, it is 
relevant to investigate the role of asymmetric information in delegating 
some tasks to the private sector and the deriving agency problems. In 
particular, it is assumed that efforts in building and managing assets are 
non-verifiable, so delegation comes with a moral hazard problem.  
The theoretical literature of mechanism design shows that, in assigning 
tasks in the presence of agency problems, the incentives in one task may 
destroy incentives in another when tasks are substitutes in the agent’s cost 
function.13  This result suggests that the stages of building and managing of 
a facility should be split when there is a negative externality between the 
                                                 
13 Holmstrom and Milgrom, (1991). 
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task of the builder and the task of the service provider, and should be 
bundled in case of a positive externality.  
In this framework, the work of Martimort-Pouyet (2006) analyses the 
effects of this moral hazard on the optimal form of delegation. Two cases 
are feasible. First, the case of a positive externality between stages, when a 
better design of the infrastructure may help to save on operating costs. 
Second, the case of a negative externality, when a better design may also 
require learning new procedures for managing assets and thus increase 
operating costs.  
A positive externality calls for the bundling of building and managing 
stages. In so making, the firm is able to internalize the positive effect of the 
effort made in the building stage on operating costs. The reason is that, 
under moral hazard, there is a trade-off between providing incentives to the 
builder to improve the quality of the infrastructure and giving him insurance 
against adverse shocks. This trade-off reduces the power of incentives, so 
the builder exerts less than the first-best effort. This decreased quality of the 
assets increases the operating costs in  the managing phase. The builder and 
the operator should thus be merged into a single entity, while the opposite is 
for a negative externality, when unbundling is desirable. The consequence is 
that a PPP is preferable to a traditional procurement in case of a positive 
externality between the phases of building and managing a public facility. 
Nevertheless, much of the benefits of bundling in a PPP are lost in the 
case of non-benevolent decision-maker. In this case, asymmetric 
information is not related to the agent but to the principal (the decision 
maker), which owns information about the sign of the externality between 
the stages of building and managing. In this case, a problem of adverse 
selection arises. Under adverse selection, the public party may be induced to 
manipulate his private information. In this way, he can report the presence 
of a positive externality while a negative one is the truth, in order to 
withdraw private benefits from conceding favour to the private operator. 
Preventing such manipulation has a social cost, due to the incentive 
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constraints necessary to induce the decision-maker to reveal the truth, and 
so part of the benefits deriving from the bundling and the PPP are offset by 
these costs. 
Another case of “inverted” asymmetric information, where the principal 
owns private information, is presented in the next section, with respect to 
information about the quality of infrastructure for the provision of a public 
service.  
 
3.2.2 Asymmetric information on the quality of infrastructure 
In general, in a principal-agent context, the agent owns an informational 
with a private knowledge about hidden information and hidden actions. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the principal owns an informational 
advantage, and the agent is the less informed party.  
Martimort-Sand-Zantman (2006) analyse the case of a local government 
(the principal) privately informed about the quality of the infrastructure that 
a potential service provider (the agent) will use. In this case, the design of 
concession contracts acts as a signal of the quality of infrastructure to the 
private parties. They analyze how this signalling issue interacts with the 
moral hazard problem that the local government faces when it delegates 
production to the private sector.  
The assumption is that some facilities have been built and operated in the 
past by local municipalities. In this case, municipalities own private 
knowledge about the quality of the existing assets. For instance, in the water 
sector, a municipality may know which of the existing assets (pumps, water 
pipes, etc...) should be renovated and when.  
The authors analyse the case of small and poorly diversified local 
governments, assumed risk averse, which delegate public services to private 
contractors, represented by large private companies operating on several 
markets. When a local government is privately informed on the quality of 
his assets, the contract signed with a private contractor is a trade-off 
between two forces. The first is that, by keeping a share of the financial risk, 
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the public agency reveals part of its private information about the quality of 
assets. The second is that, by keeping part of the financial risk, the public 
agency reduces the contractor’s incentive to exert an effort. In this way, a 
trade-off between signalling and moral hazard arises.  
In particular, contracting out the service for a fixed-fee would provide the 
private contractor with first-best incentives. However, due to the fact that 
private partner has no information on the quality of assets, the local 
government has to reduce the fixed-fee in order to convince it to participate. 
On the other hand, if the local government keeps part of the operational risk, 
this is a signal of a better technology to the agent. This strategy has 
nevertheless two costly drawbacks. First, the risk averse principal is no 
longer fully insured. Second, since the risk neutral agent no longer enjoys 
the full return on his effort, the incentives to work are reduced. 
A local government with a low quality infrastructure finds it worth 
selling the assets to the private sector for a fixed-fee. Instead, a local 
government with a high quality infrastructure chooses to keep ownership of 
the productive assets and to enjoy all returns on these assets. 
The authors suggest that local governments who face a harder budget 
constraint and thus could be assumed as being more risk averse are also the 
more likely to contracting out to private parties. Public ownership is more 
likely under high quality facilities and a less risk averse local government. 
As the agent becomes more risk averse, the case for public ownership 
becomes stronger. In fact, private involvement requires a higher risk 
premium to be paid in order to assure the risk deriving from the lack of 
information about assets.  
 
3.2.3 Asymmetric information on operative costs 
In the previous section, the public party owns a private information on the 
quality of assets. However, the more general case analysed by the principal-
agent theory is when the agent owns private information on its operative 
costs. This is the base assumption of the works of Schmidt (1996a and 
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1996b) in comparing public firms versus private regulated firms. These 
works analyse the case of privatization. Nevertheless, they may highlights 
on the effects of adverse selection which may be present also in a PPP. Due 
to asymmetric information on operative costs, a private regulated firm may 
be able, through its opportunistic behaviour, to extract an informative rent to 
the public party. The public party, introducing in the design of the contract 
participation and incentive constraints, is able to reduce the informative rent 
of the private firm. Nevertheless, the private party invest more in cost 
reducing activities in order to increase his rent, and this implies a productive 
efficiency. On the other hand, a loss in allocative efficiency is the result of 
the fact that private party is not interested in socially efficient production 
levels. An entirely public owned firm implies, instead, that the public party 
has now access to the private information of the firm about its costs. In this 
case, the public party is able to extract ex post the entire rent of the firm. 
Nevertheless, a problem of moral hazard arises. In fact, as the public partner 
is not able to commit no to expropriate ex post the rent of the firm, the firm 
does not invest in cost reducing activities, so a productive inefficiency 
arises. On the other hand, the presence of the public partner permits to 
achieve an allocative efficiency about the production levels, being interested 
to social goals.  
The problem of the lack of commitment of the public authorities is also 
analysed by Laffont-Tirole (1991 and 1993). According to the authors, the 
cost of a public firm is the suboptimal investment by the firm’s manager in 
those activities that can be redeployed by the public party in order to serve 
social goals. The important assumption is that, under the traditional 
provision of a public firm, the public party is not able to commit not to 
expropriate managerial efforts towards its social goals. As managerial effort 
is non-contractible, the fear to be expropriated of his own investment 
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generates a suboptimal effort by the management, which implies a 
productive inefficiency of the public firm.14  
The trade off between productive and allocative efficiency implies some 
considerations. The presence of private parties is important if it is relevant 
the effort in cost reducing activities, in the sense that the gains in productive 
efficiency are higher than the loss in allocative efficiency. On the other 
hand, the presence of a public partner is important if social benefits deriving 
from the production of the public service are relevant. In this case, 
allocative efficiency is more important than the gains of cost reducing 
activities.  
In presence of market competition, social benefits deriving by the 
production are lower than in a monopolistic condition, because of the 
presence of other firms, which produce substitute goods. The consequence 
is that in condition of market competition, social benefits are not relevant 
and it may be preferable the achievement of productive efficiency. Instead, 
in conditions of market power and monopolistic conditions, it may be more 
relevant the achievement of allocative efficiency, and the presence of a 
public party may be preferable in order to achieve social goals, also if this 
implies a loss in terms of productive efficiency.  
 
3.3 INSIGHTS FROM THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING THEORY 
In the previous paragraphs, we have seen that the literature of incomplete 
contracting focuses on the impossibility to write a comprehensive contract 
and on the role of allocation of control and decision rights in determine 
parties’ incentive in making relationship specific investment.  
                                                 
14 According to Polo-Scarpa (1995) the problem of the lack of commitment of the public 
sector and the risk of expropriation of the effort is present also towards private shareholders 
of a PPP. In fact, private shareholders have no incentive to invest because the public partner 
is unable to commit itself to no expropriate ex post their investment. For instance, the 
public partner as a regulator agency may be not able to constraint itself to a predetermined 
regulator policy. In fact, the public regulator may change ex post the terms of the regulation 
in order to achieve social goals, but in this way private investment may be expropriated. 
Private parties, preventing this behaviour, have no incentive to invest. 
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The New Property Rights approach may be considered as an allocative 
principle, in order to efficiently assign residual control rights over non 
human-assets. In literature, this approach has proved very useful to explain 
vertical integration and the boundaries of firms, the internal organization of 
firms and the meaning and importance of asset ownership.  
Nevertheless, contractual incompleteness and the NPR approach may 
have something to say in delineating the boundaries between private and 
public parties and in the magnitude of private sector involvement in the 
provision of public services.  
In a world of complete contracts, ownership structure and the allocation 
of residual control rights would be neutral with respect to the governmental 
goals. In a complete contracting world, the government would be able to 
achieve any goals, economic or otherwise, via a detailed initial contract. 
Hence, if something exists that makes the difference between a private firm, 
a public firm and any form of PPP, this is the presence of contractual 
incompleteness. 
 According to this view, it is natural to analyse public choice using the 
ideas of contractual incompleteness. 
A recent literature, which belongs to the strand of the contractual 
incompleteness, analyses the new organizational forms of the PPPs in an 
incomplete contracting context, in order to understand how contractual 
parties’ investment can deviate from the first best. The analysis compares 
the traditional organizational form with the new forms of PPPs.  
Hart-Shleifer-Vishny (1997), for the first time assume the idea that 
contractual incompleteness is connected to the fact that the quality the 
governments wants for a public service provision is impossible to be fully 
specified in the initial contract. The authors suggest that it is often 
impossible to verify and to enforce the quality provided because it is 
possible for the provider to reduce the quality without violating the letter of 
the contract. Indeed, as documented by empirical evidence, critics of private 
provision often argue that private contractors would cut quality in the 
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process of cutting costs because contracts do not adequately guard against 
this possibility. 
The basic idea is that the government and the provider are able to specify 
in the initial contract only some basic aspects of the service and the initial 
price. The assumption is that it is impossible to anticipate all the future 
contingencies at the time the contract is signed. Instead, the parties 
renegotiate the contract ex post once it is clear what kind of contingencies 
has occurred.  
After the contract has been signed, the provider can make a relationship-
specific investment, devoting effort towards two types of innovation relative 
to the basic service: a cost innovation and a quality innovation. In general, 
the assumption is that cost innovation leads to a reduction in costs but it is 
accompanied by a reduction in quality, while a quality innovation leads to 
an increase in quality but it is accompanied by an increase in costs. The 
assumption is that, ex ante, it is impossible to contract on innovation and on 
the relative effort, and that, ex post, a renegotiation between parties will 
occur in order to split the ex post surplus. 
In this context, the ownership of residual control rights over non-human 
assets necessary to provide the public service is relevant because it 
determine who has the authority to approve innovations when non-
contracted contingencies occur.  
A recent literature analyses the effects of bundling the different stage of 
building and managing of a facility under the assumption of contractual 
incompleteness, in order to compare the effects of a PPP with respect to a 
traditional procurement.  
 
3.3.1 Building and managing facilities: the effects of bundling under the 
assumption of contractual incompleteness 
The perspective of incomplete contracts is assumed in Hart (2003): the 
builder of the asset or the provider of the public service can modify the 
nature of the asset or the nature of the public service without violating the 
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initial contract. In fact, it is impossible to write at the initial date a complete 
contract which specify all the aspects of the provision. The initial contract 
specifies only the “basic good” to be provided. Specifically, the builder can 
make two types of non-verifiable, and non enforceable, investments: a 
productive investment, that makes the asset more attractive and easy to run, 
due to non contractible higher quality invested in the building, and an 
unproductive investment, that reduces total costs and quality. The 
productive investment is able both to increase the provision of quality and to 
reduce total costs in the stage of provision of the public good. The 
unproductive investment is able to reduce both total costs and quality in the 
stage of provision of the public good. In other words, the builder’s effort 
affects operating costs and quality only in the successive stage of the 
provision of the public good. The two types of investment are unverifiable 
and not enforceable by a third party. Nevertheless, the initial contract is not 
violated if the basic good is provided. A trade off arises between unbundling 
and bundling. 
In the case of separate contracts, or unbundling, the Government 
contracts with the builder in order to build the assets necessary to the 
provision of the good, and then he contracts with the provider in order to run 
the asset and to produce the good. The builder can make productive and 
unproductive investments, but, since these investments affect the costs and 
quality provided in the next stage of the provision, he does not internalise 
the effects of these investments, so he does not invest at all. The cost of 
unbundling is a low productive investment, while the benefit is a low 
unproductive investment.  
In the case of bundling, the builder contracts with the Government both 
the building and the managing of the asset. In so doing, he internalises the 
effect of productive and unproductive investments. The benefit is that the 
PPP is interested in making productive investment, with an increase in the 
quality of the provision of the public good. On the other hand, the cost of 
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the PPP is that he is interested in unproductive investment too, in order to 
reduce total costs, with a consequent loss of quality. 
In the model, no bargaining is assumed ex post, so the builder does not 
renegotiate the initial price. The model shows that under unbundling the 
builder does not internalise the social effect of innovations. In so doing, the 
builder does not invest in productive innovation, nevertheless he does not 
invest in unproductive investment too, and this is a benefit. On the other 
hand, under bundling, the builder again does not internalise the benefits of 
quality innovation, but he internalises the benefits of cost innovations.  
The conclusion is that unbundling is good if the quality of the asset to be 
built can be well specified, whereas the quality of the service cannot. Under 
these conditions, the underinvestment in productive innovation is not a 
serious issue. In contrast, bundling, and so a PPP, is good if the quality of 
the service can be well specified in the initial contract, whereas the quality 
of the asset cannot be.  
Bennett-Iossa (2006) also study the desirability of bundling the building 
and management of facilities used for the provision of public services and 
the optimal allocation of ownership between public and private parties.  
They assume the perspective of contractual incompleteness, and assume 
that the ownership of assets assigns the residual control rights and the right 
to decide whether any innovative activity can be implemented. A difference 
with Hart (2003) is that here the renegotiation between parties is assumed. A 
difference with H-S-V (1997) is that Bennet-Jossa (2006) does not allow for 
renegotiation in the case that the asset is owned by the private sector. 
According to Bennet-Jossa (2006) renegotiation occurs only if the 
government is the owner of the asset (p. 2145).  
Bennet-Jossa (2006) show that if there is a positive externality across the 
stages of production, bundling is always optimal since it induces the 
internalization of the externality. This is consistent with the motivation 
commonly given for the PPPs, which views the integration between the 
different stages of the provision of a public service as a device to promote 
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investment. Nevertheless, they show that the internalization of externality 
does not necessary work in favour of the PPPs. In particular, in the case that 
innovation in the building stage reduces costs at the managerial stage 
(positive externality) as well as increasing social benefit, bundling is always 
optimal, due to internalization of the positive externality. Instead, if the 
innovation in the building stage increases both costs and social benefits at 
the managerial stage, unbundling may become optimal. In fact, in this case, 
the promise by the government to reward the contractor for the increase in 
social benefit would be not credible, and an underinvestment arises from it. 
In this case, public ownership works as a commitment device for the 
government to share its benefit with the investor: the public sector is the 
owner of the asset and the contractor has no power to implement any 
innovation without the willingness of the government, unless renegotiation 
occurs. The advantage of public ownership is that it induces to 
renegotiation, and the advantage of renegotiation is the partial 
internalization of the effect of investment on social benefit. In this case, 
public ownership may become optimal. 
 
3.3.2 Rinegotiation and contractual power 
We have seen that, in an incomplete contracting context, the renegotiation 
of the initial contractual conditions assumes an important role in the 
determination of ex post surplus and of parties’ incentives in making 
relationship specific investment. According too this view, the parties’ 
contractual power in the ex post renegotiation stage is determinant in the 
division of the ex post surplus. Therefore, parties’ contractual power 
becomes one of the most important factors in the managing of a long-term 
relationship. The consequence is that contractual power of public and 
private parties should be well balanced. Unfortunately, in many cases, 
public parties may be in a weaker position than the private counterpart in the 
renegotiation stage, because of a lower contractual power. The reason 
depends on the governmental levels involved in the relationship. In fact, a 
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small and poorly diversified municipality, which may be not able to manage 
complex and multimillionaire contracts with external private parties, is 
surely in a weak position. 
On the other hand, private parties involved in a PPP are selected through 
a competitive auction, in order to choose the most efficient firm to provide 
the public service. Nevertheless, bidders often anticipate the possibility of 
renegotiation, and base their bids not only on their costs, but also on the cost 
of securing the contract. At the auction stage, bidders can take into account 
their potential market power once the relationship is engaged with the public 
partner, and they take into account their bargaining power in the 
renegotiation stage. In fact, the presence of relationship specific investment 
determines a lock-in effect, and the relationship becomes a bilateral 
monopoly.15 In the period between the award of the contract and the 
renegotiation, the private party may increase its bargaining power. If the 
public party is a weak contractual position, the private party is able to 
extract a better deal in the renegotiation stage. Under these conditions, 
underbidding becomes a way to increase the probability of winning an 
auction, with the possibility that the renegotiation reduces ex post the losses 
of such ex ante behaviour. 
 
3.3.3 The residual value of assets  
In an incomplete contracting context, under conditions of specific 
investments in material assets necessary to provide a public service, the 
incentive in making such investment is a crucial factor. With respect to this, 
an important aspect to be considered is the residual value of assets.  
The residual value of material assets used to provide a public service 
depends on many factors. In the initial stage, the builder’s effort is 
important in building a high quality asset. The effort devoted by the service 
                                                 
15 In this case, the “fundamental transformation” of Williamson (1985) arises, where, due to 
specific investment of parties, a market relationship becomes a bilateral monopoly. Parties 
are no longer able to refer to alternative agents on the market. 
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provider in maintenance activities during the contract assures the assets 
from the depreciation process. Finally, the possibility of a private use, 
alternative to the public use, of the asset at the end of the contract is 
determinant in assigning a market value to it. The high specificity of a 
specific asset for a public use reduces its private value, and so its market 
value.  
Bennet-Iossa (2006) show that the automatic transfer of assets from a 
private contractor to the public party at the end of the contract is welfare 
reducing. The assumption is that the contractor owns residual control rights 
over the assets during the contractual period, and he has no incentive to 
invest in these assets. The reason it that, anticipating the automatic transfer 
of the assets, the private contractor does not benefits of his efforts, so he 
does not invest. According to the authors, this incentive would increase if 
the automatic transfer of assets were left open to a voluntary negotiated 
transfer. In this case, the private contractor would receive part of the 
benefits of his investment, and his incentive to invest would rise. On the 
other hand, a negotiation at the end of the contract may be length and may 
create uncertainties in the public service provision. It may be also the case 
that, because the provision of the public service needs to be continued using 
the assets, negotiation may give to the private contractor the possibility to 
exert hold-up towards to the public party. 
 
3.3.4 The IPPPs and the public partner as a shareholder 
In the case of a PPP, the provider of the public service has the residual 
rights of control over the way the service is provided. After the initial 
contact has been signed, the provider may come up with innovative ways of 
providing the service. In an incomplete contracting approach, it is 
impossible to foresee such innovations in the initial contract, so the splitting 
of the surplus deriving form the implementation of these innovations is 
subject to ex post bargaining of the contractual parties. The service provider 
anticipates the outcome of the bargaining over the division of the surplus 
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deriving from innovations, with implications on his incentive to invest in the 
research of possible innovations. The research of possible innovations in 
providing the public service is a non contractible relationship specific 
investment, and the allocation of residual control rights to the party that 
support this cost may induce it to invest. 
In the case of classical procurement, the public sector may be assumed 
welfare maximizing, disliking monetary transfers to the provider because of 
the cost of raising funds to finance such transfers due to distorsive taxation. 
The case of an institutional PPP (IPPP) is quite different in the objective 
function to maximize. The IPPP is a joint venture between public and 
private sector, which own a participation in the capital of this entity, and this 
entity retains the residual control rights on decisions to be taken. According 
to Bennet-Iossa (2005), a IPPP maximizes an objective function that is a 
combination of its own profits and of the social benefit deriving from the 
provision of the public service. In this way, the contract is signed from an 
agent that does not maximize social welfare, though has some concern for 
social benefit.  
Under a IPPP an overinvestment in cost reducing activity arises. In fact, 
since the IPPP has control rights, it can implement the cost reducing 
innovation unilaterally without bargaining with the government, and there is 
overinvestment because the IPPP does not take into account the negative 
effect of this innovation on the social benefit. 
On the other hand, if the presence of a public party in the IPPP is high, 
the effects of underinvestment in quality-enhancing innovations are 
alleviated. In fact, in this case, the weight of the social benefits in the utility 
function of the IPPP is high, due to the larger presence of the public partner. 
The conclusion is that if the participation of the public agency is not high 
in the PPP, delegation of contracting is never optimal for quality-enhancing 
innovations, while it is optimal for cost-reducing innovations. 
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3.4 THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF A PPP 
The particular feature of the PPPs is that the public party is not able to 
describe, at the date the contract is signed, the exact way to provide the 
public service he wants. The chapter 2 shows that, due to the complex 
nature of the public projects involving the PPPs, it is a general claim that the 
public party  prefers to specify in the initial contract the output, and not the 
input, the final result, and not the means necessary to realize it. On the other 
hand, in the present chapter we have seen that an incomplete contract is 
characterized by the fact that it’s impossible to describe all future 
contingencies, so the contract is revised every time during the relationship. 
It is surprising that the basic features of a PPP and of an incomplete contract 
are the same! For this reason, we argue that the economic nature of a PPP is 
that of an incomplete contract, where the public party is not able to describe 
ex ante the input and the means necessary to realize his aims. And this is 
truth both for the class of the contractual PPP and for the institutional PPP.  
The CPPP have in common the features of incomplete contracts. In 
particular, the competitive dialogue, where the law defines it as a complex 
contract, when it is difficult to define the technical means and objectives 
able to supply a public service. In some cases, public authority is objectively 
unable to define also the legal and/or financial form of a project. It is clear 
that a contract in this form is necessarily an incomplete contract. 
In the concession contracts and in the PFI , it is often present the problem 
of the public transfers (subsidies), because the franchise may be not able to 
cover the entire cost on the public service. It may be case that it is 
impossible to describe ex ante the level of public transfers, because it is not 
known the demand function of the service. Moreover, the problem of the 
quality of the public provision is a serious question, because it is difficult to 
describe ex ante all the aspects of the provision, due to the long duration of 
the contract. We have also seen that, in some cases, it is difficult to describe 
precisely the kind and the amount of network investment. For these reasons, 
these contracts assume the nature of incomplete contracts. 
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In the case of the institutional PPP, public and private parties agree to 
create a separate entity that is a joint venture, in order to provide a public 
service. The participation of a public party to the entity may be seen as a 
way to avoid the problem of the contractual incompleteness. In fact, the 
public party, as a shareholder, holds part of the residual control rights on the 
assets and on the relevant decision concerning the public project. In this 
way, he can impose ex post his willingness when the contingencies will 
reveal in the future. The difficulty in describing ex ante means and aims is 
overcome by owing part of the property and control rights in the project. So, 
also in this case, the IPPP has the economic nature of an incomplete 
contract.16  
In each case, the contractual power of the parties is the key factor that 
determine the splitting of the ex post surplus in the renegotiation stage.  
Basile-Trani (2008) show that, under uncertainty conditions and in 
presence of relationship-specific investment, contractual parties may prefer 
to sign a so called intentionally incomplete contract. Parties leave open 
some aspects of the trade to be bargained ex post during the relationship, 
when uncertainty will become clear. The authors show that, under certain 
conditions, this type of loose contract may be preferable to the introduction 
of too restrictive incentive constraints. 
In this framework, we argue that the PPP are incomplete contracts, where 
the parties has the willingness to define some aspects of the relationship, but 
they leave open some others, in order to decide ex post, when the 
contingencies will become clear.  
According to this view, the approach and the methodology of the 
incomplete contracts are an important tool to examine the world of the 
PPPs. 
                                                 
16 According to Laffont-Martimort (2001) “…[p]roperty rights are usually incomplete 
contracts. Indeed, property rights define what can be obtained by the agents in the status 
quo of the ex post Nash bargaining over the gains from trade” (p. 373). 
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In the next chapter, we analyse the development of PPPs in the water 
sector, and the different way it is organized in the most important European 
countries. Then, we use the approach of the contractual incompleteness to 
analyse the role of PPPs in the water sector, in order to understand the effect 
on endogenous risk deriving from different forms of PPPs.  
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4. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE WATER 
SECTOR. 
The water sector exhibits a number of industrial characteristics that embody 
a conflicting nature between allocative and productive efficiency. These 
characteristics create the need for the public intervention in the sector, in 
order to achieve allocative efficiency aims, impossible to achieve with only 
the presence of market mechanisms.  
The water sector is a case where public intervention may occur through a 
continuum of organizational forms, with a more or less involvement of 
private parties in the provision of water services. As we have seen in the 
chapter 2, the government may choose among the fully public provision and 
a variety of forms of PPPs. We have seen that the rationale of private sector 
involvement in PPPs deals with productive efficiency arguments. 
Nevertheless, the presence of public party is essential in pursuing allocative 
efficiency aims, in particular through the tools of regulation.   
Until the 1990s, national governments and international institutions, like 
as the World Bank, mainly based their politics on Keynesian and classical 
economics. Market failures were recognized to occur in case of natural 
monopoly, externalities, and in presence of public good aspects of many 
infrastructure projects. Therefore, public sector was seen as the main actor 
also in the infrastructure water sector. The form of the fully public provision 
of water services was the norm in developed and developing countries, on 
the basis that it would have been straightforward to control prices and 
behaviours of public firms.   
In the early 1990s, with the increasing awareness of Governments about 
environmental degradation of water resources, United Nations and 
international community started to change their perception about public 
provision in the water sector. In 1992, the Conference on Water in Dublin 
and the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio imposed a 
new approach for water management, described in the so-called Dublin 
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Principles.17 Water was recognized as an economic good, a commodity that 
should be priced at its true economic value, that is at its cost of provision. 
Nevertheless, water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to life, 
development and environment. Therefore, water management should be 
based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy 
makers.   
This new approach reflected also the World Bank policies. The World 
Bank is one of the major international actor in the water infrastructure sector 
of developing countries. In fact, lending for water resources investment 
accounted for about 16 percent of all World Bank lending over the past 
decade. In the 1990s, the World Bank’s policy changed. Public sector was 
seen as lacking of innovative capacity, inefficient, unable to compete in 
world markets, and corrupt. The current system dominated by a fully public 
provision was perceived as inefficient and the private sector was seen as a 
way to achieve an innovative approach, an efficient management and a cut 
in the cost of public subsidies in water infrastructure. Market failures were 
replaced by state failures. This radical change in the public policy occurred 
worldwide and became the main reform policies of the major international 
organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development). The 1993 World Bank’s Policy 
Paper reflects the broad principles of the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. In 
particular, World Bank states that a modern water management needs a 
much greater attention to the environment. Water management needs that all 
stakeholders participate, including the State, the private sector and civil 
society, women need to be included and resource management should 
respect the principle of subsidiarity, with actions taken at the lowest 
                                                 
17 The four Dublin Principles on water are the following. 1) Fresh water is a finite and 
vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment. 2) Water 
development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving 
users, planners and policy-makers at all levels. 3) Women play a central part in the 
provision, management and safeguarding of water. 4) Water has an economic value in all 
its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good. 
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appropriate level. Moreover, water is a scarce resource and a greater use 
needs to be made of incentives and economic principles in improving 
allocation and enhancing quality. 
Fifteen years later, experience shows that the Dublin Principles have 
provided inspiration and direction for many water reforms both in 
developed and in developing countries. In particular, many forms of both 
contractual and institutional PPPs have been experienced, with a more or 
less involvement of the private sector. Nevertheless, experience shows that 
private involvement in the water sector remains a controversial issue. The 
model of PPP is always complex, and this is also true in the case of water 
supply. The question of the role of the State in the water sector is crucial, 
and it might be that a PPP leads to more State involvement than expected, 
because of the need of institutional arrangements for regulation. 
In this chapter we analyses the phenomenon of the PPPs in the water 
sector. Initially, the analysis of the special features of the water sector is 
necessary to understand the particular issues arising from these features, and 
this is made in the section 4.1. After a survey of the empirical research of 
the water sector made in the section 4.2, the experiences of the most 
important European countries are provided in the section 4.3. The section 
4.4 provides a comparison of the various water systems analysed.  
 
4.1 SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE WATER SECTOR 
We have seen that water sector exhibits a number of industrial 
characteristics that create the need for the public intervention in the sector in 
order to achieve allocative and productive aims. In this section we analyses 
the special features of this sector, beginning from the infrastructure and 
from the condition of natural monopoly. Then, the informational constraints 
are analysed, which a public regulator has to face in choosing its policy.  A 
survey of the various regulation frameworks is provided, in particular of the 
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tariff regulation. Finally, the features of the demand and the issue of 
affordability are analysed. 
 
4.1.1 Water infrastructure 
Drinking water infrastructure includes treatment and storage plants, pumps  
and a distribution system. All these long period assets require intensive 
fixed capital investment. In fact, fixed costs of water suppliers are typically 
high relative to variable costs. The study of Armstrong-Cowan-Vickers 
(1994) shows that, in England and Wales, fixed costs represent 80 per cent 
of total costs.  
The consequence is also that revenues are principally used to cover the 
cost of investment in infrastructure, and that the amortization period is long. 
Due to the long amortization period, the duration of water contract is 
generally long. In Italy, on average a water contract cover a period of 27 
years. In England, for obtaining the end of the contract, a minimum 
notification period of 25 years is required. A short duration of water 
contracts may be observable in France, where often a service contract is 
signed, not including investment obligations for the water provider. 
Nevertheless, in this case, investment cost is bored entirely by the local 
municipalities.  
Moreover, a large part of water infrastructure is fixed in place and has no 
alternative use. The presence of an intensive, fixed in place and asset 
specific investment is an important feature of the water sector. In fact, due 
to these features, the residual market value of this specific investment is 
low. The value of the investment in water infrastructure is linked to its 
public use. In general, water assets return to the public authority at the end 
of the contract. Every investment on these assets is so a sunk cost, and a 
water provider is interested to cover this cost before the contract expires. In 
this case, we have seen in the previous chapter that a problem of 
underinvestment arises. In fact, the automatic transfer of material assets to 
the public party at the end of the contract may be welfare reducing, because 
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the party’s incentive to invest is weakened by the fact that he has no benefits 
form such investment.  
 
4.1.2 The natural monopoly 
A natural monopoly arises when, due to the technology of the supply and 
the level of the demand, it is optimal to organize production with only one 
firm. In economic terms, the notion of natural monopoly is linked to the 
condition of sub-additivity of the cost function.  
If y is the amount of output, a cost function c(y) is strictly sub-additive in 
y if  
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This means that the cost of producing the amount y of output with only 
one firm is lower than the cost of producing the same quantity with any 
number H of different firms. The implicit assumption is that all firms face 
the same cost function. With respect to this definition, a natural monopoly 
arises if the cost function is sub-additive along the entire relevant range of 
the production level y, with respect to the level of demand.  It is possible to 
show that, in the case of a single product firm, the presence of decreasing 
average costs is a sufficient, not necessary, condition to have a sub-additive 
cost function. This is the case of high capital-intensive sectors, with a high 
component of fixed costs with respect to variable costs.   
We have seen that, in the water sector, the presence of intensive capital 
investment, in order to realize treatment and storage plants, pumps and a 
widespread distribution network, determines a high percentage of fixed 
costs with respect to variable costs. The water sector is so characterized by 
conditions under which a natural monopoly arises.  
Because of the presence of the natural monopoly, direct competition 
(competition in the market) is very difficult. Economic theory elaborates 
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other forms of direct competition: the cross-border competition and the 
common carriage. In the first case, the public authority gives licence to 
supply large industrial consumers in the area of another water supplier. In 
the second case, several water suppliers use a single network to supply 
customers, and customers can choose their water suppliers. Some rare cases 
of these forms of competition are present in England. Nevertheless, 
according to Balance and Taylor (2005), the presence of the cross-border 
competition and of the common carriage is unlikely to develop in the future. 
In fact, in the first case it is necessary a relevant investment for building 
alternative network linked to industrial consumers. In the second case, a 
problem of monitoring the water quality arises, because it is impossible to 
identify the responsible for water quality incidents under common carriage. 
Unlike gas and electricity, experience does not show any successful model 
of competition in the water sector. In fact, the efficiency gains does not 
outweigh the costs deriving from the limited competition introduced in the 
sector. 
Other forms used to introduce an indirect competition in the water sector 
are the competition for the market and the yardstick competition. 
Competition for the market arises when a potential service providers bid 
for the right to supply a monopolistic market under a certain period.18 
According to some economists a mechanism can be designed that will 
take advantage of competition for the right to serve the market so as to 
achieve desirable objectives – elimination of monopoly rents, efficient 
pricing, and productive efficiency. Nevertheless, according to Williamson 
(1985), this competition process cannot be designed without introducing the 
high transaction costs and administrative complexity of traditional 
                                                 
18 In order to simplify the exposition we omit the analyses of the auctions. Beginning from 
the work of Demsetz (1968), auction theory is become an important strand of the economic 
literature. Following the development of the game theory, the auction theory quickly 
progressed between 1975 and 1985, and now is an applied branch of game theory which 
deals with how people act in auction markets and researches the game-theoretic properties 
of auction markets.  
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regulation. With auctioning, the potential suppliers bid against each other to 
obtain the contract. The contract is usually awarded to the bidder that offers 
to supply water at the lowest price. However, the contract should describe 
also the amount of investment over time and the quality of the service. 
Moreover, the price selected by the bidding process is not fixed over the 
partnership period and may be renegotiated due to change in circumstances, 
unforeseen events and numerous pressures. Therefore, regulation is 
necessary to ensure that a monopoly power does not arise during the 
relationship. In the water sector, where service provision is characterized by 
long-term contracts and information asymmetries, the public party has to 
ensure transparency of technical and financial information of the water 
system. Nevertheless, an open and transparent competitive process is 
substantially time consuming and costly for both bidders and public 
authorities. The work of  Haarmeyer and Mody (1998) shows some 
examples of the entity of these transaction costs. In Buenos Aires, for 
example, the cost of consultants which helped the government in evaluating 
the bids for the concession of the water service was estimated in [US]$ 4 
million. Each consortium bidding on the Buenos Aires tender reported 
expenses for about $2-$3 million in preparing its proposal. These high costs 
are a deterrent for smaller firms, and may explain why there are usually only 
a few bidders in tendering processes in the water sector. The work of Foster 
(2005) shows that in Mexico City, five on ten water contracts had only one 
bidder participating to the auction. Moreover, the bidders are often a small 
group of multinationals that dominate the international water market, as we 
have seen in the previous section. We have seen that, in France, between 
1999 and 2001 the average number of offers received vary between 2,1 and 
2,4. In Italy, the average number of bids is 1,1.  
Experience shows also that competition is restricted when contracts are 
re-tendered because the incumbent has information that gives him an 
advantage in bidding to retain the contracts. Furthermore, under concession 
contracts, the incumbent can ask for compensation for his investment. In 
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France, in 99% of cases private operators are renewed in their water 
contracts. 
Comparative or “yardstick” competition is a way for the regulator to 
reduce asymmetric information about the firm’s cost. The idea here is that 
firm’s costs should be compared with those of other firms, possibly in 
different geographical markets, facing a similar technology. However, 
despite its attractive perspectives, yardstick competition is not normally 
used in the water sector. Yardstick competition should, in theory, encourage 
efficiency and refrain monopolists from diverging from least-cost derived 
from the other firms. However, yardstick competition is demanding in terms 
of data and analysis. Costs of different regional monopolies differ due to 
variations in operating environment and inherited infrastructure, and 
regulators need to make costs comparable by using econometric methods. 
For these reasons, yardstick competition is normally inherently subjective 
and thus introduces scope for regulatory opportunism and uncertainty for 
water companies, which weakens their incentives to invest. Yardstick 
competition has been applied in England and Wales in combination with 
price-cap regulation, where comparisons between companies are done when 
setting and resetting price controls. The results of yardstick competition in 
the United Kingdom water sector are mixed. According to Renzetti and 
Dupont (2004), the efforts of OFWAT (the British water regulator) to 
promote competition in the English water industry seem to have been only 
partially successful. 
 
4.1.3 Informational constraints 
As the most part of economic relationship, also the provision of water 
services is characterized by informational constraints, which limit the 
control of the contractor operative costs and on the quality provided.  
The two main types of information constraints are moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Moral hazard refers to variables that are impossible to 
verify by a third party, like as a court. In this way, public party is not able to 
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enforce the contract with respect to these variables. These variables refer to 
discretionary actions taken by the contractor, which may affect costs and 
quality of the services provided. These actions are summarised under the 
label of effort, and, in this case, a problem of unverifiable information 
arises. The effort may stand for the number of hours worked by a firm’s 
manager, or for the intensity of his labour. Adverse selection is referred to 
the case that one party may have private information at the date of 
contracting. In this case of asymmetric information, public party does not 
know the firms’ technological possibilities and its cost structure. In other 
words, the public party does not know the actual amount of costs that a 
certain firm needs to provide to service required, because he does not know 
its productivity level.  
On the other hand, with respect to the water infrastructure, the quality of 
the existing water assets may generate another informational constraint. In 
fact, these assets may have been built and operated in the past by the 
municipalities. In this case, municipalities have acquired private knowledge 
about the quality of water infrastructure. For example, a municipality may 
know which of the existing assets (pumps, water pipes, metering systems 
and so on) should be renewed and when. In the water sector, according to 
Martimort-Sand-Zantman (2006), the public party (principal) benefits of an 
informational advantage on the service provider (agent), differing from the 
classical case of the principal agent theory, where the agent normally 
benefits of the informational advantage. On the other hand, it is extremely 
costly for a private party to verify the quality of assets announced by the 
local government. In fact, different with a hospital or an electric central, the 
water network is widespread in a generally great area, and consists of 
existing assets, in many cases hidden assets, to be valued one by one. A 
feature of the water sector is that the most part of water assets are 
underground. Hence obtaining accurate information about them can be 
costly and there is generally a lack of reliable information about the 
condition of existing infrastructure.  
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Moreover, it is possible that also the municipality has no perfect 
information on the quality of its assets. We can observe the Italian case. In 
Italy, the AATO is responsible to writing an investment plan for the entire 
duration of the concession contract. As we will see in the next paragraph, 
the national water authority (COVIRI, 2008) states that, by a sample of 
water investment plans attached to the concession contracts, the analyses of 
the water plants is often incomplete in the technical aspects, and the 
database are not always reliable. On the other hand, it is extremely costly to 
a third party to verify information included in a twenty-year investment 
plan.  
The consequence of this lack of information about the quality of the 
water assets may be a source of conflict and renegotiations after the contract 
has been signed. It may also be difficult to judge the quality of the work 
done by a private provider in a short period.  
 
4.1.4 The regulation framework, contractual parties and bargaining power  
One of the most important factors in organizing water services is the he 
model of regulation adopted. The two main models are the regulation by 
independent authority and the regulation by contract.  
The regulation by independent authority is based on a unique national 
authority, independent from national and local governments, which 
promotes a homogeneous regulation of the national water sector. The model 
of regulation by contract does not include any national regulator, because 
every duty and obligation is regulated by the contract signed between 
parties. A local dimension of regulation characterizes this model. In fact, in 
this case, water sector is in the responsibility of rather small and poorly 
diversified local municipalities. Moreover, due to the small entity of these 
local governmental bodies and their poorly diversified activity, they are 
often induced to contracting out water services ant the related considerable 
investment in order to overcome balance constraints, such as those deriving 
from the European Pact of Stability and Growth, as we have seen in the 
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section 2. In fact, in so making, costs and investment related to water 
services are recorded off balance in the local government accountancy, and 
do not affect their budget constraints.   
Nevertheless, in this framework, bargaining power may be not balanced 
between very small local governments and the great multinationals 
participating to a tender. Local governments, like as municipalities, usually 
do not have the necessary expertise to oversee complex contracts, 
particularly long term contracts granting a large degree of autonomy to the 
contractor. Municipalities find themselves negotiating multi-million euros 
contract with private multinational companies. According to OECD (2006), 
for many of them, this is a new experience, and the results are major 
disparities in bargaining power, particularly when large, international water 
operating companies are involved.  
In this framework, local governments in fact may bore more risk than the 
contract suggest.  
Moreover, the private sector increasingly demands guarantees and public 
subsidies, especially when it invest in developing countries. Some of these 
guarantees, such as take-or-pay contracts (the public sector is bound to pay 
for set quantities of water irrespective of actual use) or guaranteed rates of 
return on investment, may dilute incentives for private sector performance.  
In this case, incentive in productive efficiency can decrease if, in order to 
attract the desired investment, it is necessary to reduce private risks by 
providing guarantees and onerous clauses. But this is the opposite of the 
aims of the involvement of the private sector. 
 
4.1.5 The determination of water tariffs 
The most important variable to be regulated by the public sector in 
organizing water provision services is the determination of tariffs that 
consumers have to pay to the contractor. Two main forms of regulation of 
water tariffs are possible. They are the rate of return regulation and the 
price-cap regulation. 
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The spirit of the rate of return regulation is to chose tariffs in order to 
equate total revenue and total cost. In a first stage, in order to determine the 
necessary revenue, the regulator analyses the historical operating costs over 
a certain period, and estimates depreciation on previous investments. Costs 
are adjusted by eliminating unjustified expenditures, and then by using 
projections on inflation and other future shocks. Then the regulator chooses 
a reasonable rate of return for the capital invested. The level of forecasted 
costs plus the chosen rate of return determines the level of revenue required. 
The second stage consists in choosing the tariff level and the relative tariffs 
in order to realize the revenue required. Once the tariffs are determined, 
they are fixed until the next tariffs review. Tariffs may be indexed to 
inflation or to the price of some inputs. A crucial matter in determining the 
incentive properties of the rate of return regulation is the length of time over 
which the tariffs are fixed. In fact, if the regulatory lag is infinite, the rate of 
return regulation assumes a nature of fixed price contract, with the firm as a 
residual claimant for its cost savings. In practice, regulatory reviews can be 
initiated by the regulated firm or by the regulator agency. In general, a firm 
facing rising costs of inputs ask to the regulator for permission to raise 
tariffs. Tariffs are adjusted as necessary to ensure that the realized rate of 
return on investment does not deviate substantially from the target rate. 
Prices are adjusted to reflect significant changes in costs; and the regulator 
is required to ensure that the firm has the opportunity to earn the contracted 
target rate of return. 
Price-cap regulation does not make explicit use of accounting data. The 
regulator fixes ceilings tariffs for either all products or a basket of them 
(average or weighted price), and the firm is free to choose its tariffs at or 
below the ceilings. An indexation clause adjusts these ceilings over the 
regulation period. Price-cap regulation, in its pure form (infinite regulatory 
lag) rules out contractual use of cost data. The difficulty is that, in this case, 
it requires the regulator to have good knowledge of cost and demand 
conditions. Too high a tariff ceiling makes the firm an unregulated 
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monopolist, too low a cap conflicts with the financial equilibrium of the 
firm, and the right tariff level may be difficult to calculate.  
Like rate of return regulation, price cap fixes the tariffs for a certain 
period. Nevertheless, the spirit is different. In fact, price cap is prospective 
rather than retrospective. The firm’s historical cost is not the base of future 
tariffs, but the setting of tariffs are equivalent to impose a fixed price 
contract, with a high incentive power. In fact, the specified tariffs increase 
often is linked to the overall rate of price inflation, and typically does not 
reflect the firm’s realized production costs or profit. In so making, the firm 
can have strong incentives to reduce its operating costs. Moreover, the 
distance between regulatory reviews is set exogenously, not endogenously 
(usually four or five years). Nevertheless, evidence shows that it is not so in 
the practice. In fact, often the regulator has difficulties in not intervening 
when pressured to reduce prices in the face of large profits, or to increase 
prices when the firm shows signs of a potential default.  
According to Armstrong - Sappington (2007), rate-of-return and price 
cap regulation can have different effects on unobservable investment (e.g., 
managerial effort) designed to reduce operating costs and on observable 
infrastructure investment. Because it links prices directly to the realized 
costs, rate-of-return regulation is unlikely to induce substantial unobserved 
cost-reducing investment. However, rate-of-return regulation can promote 
observable infrastructure investment by limiting the risk that such 
investment will be expropriated. In contrast, price cap regulation can 
provide strong incentives for unobservable cost-reducing effort, especially 
when the regulatory commitment period (the length of time between 
regulatory reviews) is relatively long. Therefore, according to the authors 
the choice between these two forms of regulation will depend in part on the 
relative importance of the two forms of investment. In settings where the 
priority is to induce the regulated firm to employ its existing infrastructure 
more efficiently, a price cap regime may be preferable. In settings where it 
is important to reverse a history of chronic under-investment in key 
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infrastructure, a guaranteed rate of return on (prudently incurred) 
investments may be preferable.  
 
4.1.6 The characteristics of water demand  
Due to its nature of essential good for life and health, water is characterized 
by an inelastic demand, with respect both to the tariff and to the service 
quality aspects. Moreover, water market is generally mature, especially in 
developed countries, with low possibility of new contracts.  As we will see 
in the next chapter, in England market analysts state that, for the water 
companies, opportunities for new revenue deriving from new contracts are 
limited, because of a mature demand. In France, the connection rate19 of 
rural population, that is generally lower than that one of urban population, is 
equal to 98.2%. In general, developed countries have a high percentage of 
connection rates and there is a very limited room for new contracts. 
These features of the water demand have important implication in 
determining incentives of private parties involved in its provision.  
In fact, a recurring argument in favour of PPPs is that private parties’ 
involvement ensures higher incentives in providing water quality and a 
higher standard service because of the opportunity of increasing revenue.  
Unfortunately, the consequence of a mature and inelastic demand, with 
respect both to the price and to the service quality, is that revenues and 
profits will depend heavily on tariff increases, which depend on how water 
tariffs are determined. In this framework, incentive of private parties to 
invest in quality in order to achieve new contracts, and so new revenue, are 
diluted and very weak. 
 
4.1.7 The issue of water affordability 
Due to the fact that water is essential for life and health, access and 
affordability of its bills for the entire population are important for 
                                                 
19 The connection rate represents the share of population served by the water network.  
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determining overall social welfare. In fact, the requirement of universal 
provision leads to a trade-off between productive and allocative efficiency.  
Allocative efficiency deals with social welfare aims. In the case of the 
water sector, social goals are the connection to the water network and the 
affordability of the water bills for all classes of population.  
The issue of affordability is linked to the consumers’ ability to pay water 
bills. According to OECD, an indicator of water affordability is the share of 
disposable income spent in water charges. The analyses of OECD (2002) 
shows that the threshold value of water bills affordability is between 3 and 
5% of the disposable income. A higher value may determine high social 
problems, especially for the poor social classes, which may be unable to pay 
water bills and may be subject to the break of the provision.20 The following 
table, elaborated by CO.VI.RI (2008), shows the affordability of water 
charges in Italy.  
 
Affordability 
Annual water bill (€)   
 On average income 
On low income 
classes 
Average 250 1,07%  2,15% 
Maximum  587 2,52%  5,04% 
Minimum  81 0,35%  0,69% 
Standard Deviation 65 0,28%  0,56% 
Average annual cost, including VAT, for a consumption of 200 m3/year, and levels of 
affordability in Italy in 2007. Source: CO.VI.RI (2008) 
 
The table shows that, on average, water cost is lower than 3% of 
disposable income. Nevertheless, if the analyses considers only the poorest 
classes, with a low disposable income, there are cases where water cost is 
                                                 
20 According to OECD, available evidence of affordability indicators suggests that, in about 
half of OECD countries (15 out of 30), affordability of water charges for low-income 
households is either a significant issue now or might become one in the future, if 
appropriate policy measures are not put in place. 
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high than 5% of disposable income. This is a signal of a difficulty in Italy in 
affording such a cost for the poorest class of population. 
In France, according to Reynaud (2007), water charge is 1.2% of average 
disposable income. Nevertheless, considering only the poorest classes of 
population, the percentage is 4.8%. The issue of affordability is relevant in 
developing countries. In South America that water charges increasing in 
those countries have determined unsustainable costs for householders. In 
some cases water bills were the 20% of disposable income, due to the low 
level of wages.  
All these considerations imply that the public authority has to be heavily 
involved in regulating water services. In fact, the problem of affordability of 
the water bills may create a problem in the future cash flows deriving from 
the concession contract, and this may be a cause of disagreement between 
public and private parties.  
The mechanism put in place by French public authorities and private 
firms in order to guarantee an affordable access to water corresponds to the 
creation of a financial aid designed to help low-income households facing 
difficulties for paying the water bill. In this case a fund has to be created, 
financed by a fee on the water bills or by the general taxation. 
 
4.2 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ABOUT PPP IN THE WATER SECTOR 
In this paragraph we try to understand if empirical investigations are able to 
identify the preferable organizational form for the provision of water 
services. Unfortunately, in the economic literature there are few empirical 
studies evaluating the effects of public-private partnerships in the water 
sector. Since PPPs are difficult to characterize empirically, most of the 
studies focus on the two extremes of public and private ownership. 
Moreover, according to Renzetti and Dupont (2004), it is difficult to draw 
any robust empirical conclusion in favour of a specific ownership structure.  
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A first empirical approach examines the links between ownership and 
performance by estimating an aggregate cost function for water utilities. The 
results are not unanimous. Crain and Zardkoohi (1978) find that private 
water utilities have, on average, lower costs. Conversely, Bruggink (1982) 
finds no cost difference, while Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983) find that 
public utilities have lower costs.  
Other empirical studies use a cost frontier approach. Bhattacharyya et al. 
(1995) define inefficiency as the difference between actual cost and its 
theoretical optimal value on a cost frontier. They analyze whether 
ownership structure may explain this inefficiency. They find that private and 
public firms deviate by 19 percent and 10 percent respectively from 
minimum cost. Hence, according to the authors, public firms are more 
efficient than private firms.  
It is worth notice that these studies do not lead to any evidence about the 
relative productive efficiency of private or public ownership.  
Nevertheless, according to Renzetti and Dupont (2003), these empirical 
approaches focus on a conceptual distortion about the cost basic assumption. 
In fact, one of the key assumptions of both approaches is that firms, either 
public or private, minimize costs, while the principal-agency literature 
shows that this assumption should be made with caution.  
There is no much research on the effects of the ownership structure on 
consumers, in particular on water quality and prices. Orwin (1999) and 
Houstma (2003) both provide evidence that, on average, private firms 
charge higher prices than public ones in France and California, respectively. 
Ballance and Taylor (2005) report on a study of water prices in France in 
May 2001 by the French Ministry of Agriculture and the French 
Environment Institute. The study is based on a survey of 5000 
municipalities and covers 68 percent of the French population. They found 
that, on average, water delivered by private companies is 27 percent more 
expensive than that delivered by public operators.  
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However, Buller (1996) shows that there are more private firms in areas 
where costs of supply are higher. This suggests that private involvement is 
more likely where costs are higher, giving a possible explanation of why 
prices to consumers charged by private firms are higher than public firms.  
The last consideration highlights a distortion of the empirical studies 
whose results may be misleading. Such studies test the effect of ownership 
on performance often assuming that other factors remain constant. This 
assumption can bias the results. In fact, the difficulty of empirical analysis is 
due to the fact that the performance of different ownership structures may 
not be compared without separating the effects of other factors, making the 
data homogeneous.  
Renzetti and Dupont (2004) identify three main factors that have to be 
neutralized in order to compare the performance of different ownership 
structures: the size of the firm, the physical environment, and the policy and 
regulatory environment.  
Because of the high initial investments needed in water supply, a larger 
firm may be able to produce more and hence enjoy economies of scale as 
the cost per unit decreases. And this is an important difference with respect 
to a smaller firm. 
The physical environment is also important, because a firm with a supply 
of poor quality water will likely have a higher cost than one with a supply of 
clean water. Moreover topography, population density and the type of 
customer mix also have a significant impact on performance.  
Finally, water quality standards, health and safety regulations, as well as 
tax rules and pricing also influence performance. Differences in 
performance may be caused by differences in regulations across 
jurisdictions or by the fact that regulation and taxation are applied 
differently between public and private utilities.  
The conclusion is that, at the present, empirical studies do not lead to any 
evidence about the relative efficiency, in productive or allocative terms, of 
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private firms with respect to public firms, or of a certain form of PPP with 
respect to another.  
Nevertheless, empirical investigation seems to have indicated the answer 
to an important question: if, in the analyses of the water sector, the 
ownership structure has to be considered as an endogenous or exogenous 
variable. 
According to Martimort-Sand-Zantman (2006) it is misleading to treat 
ownership as an exogenous variable when estimating the water demand and 
the cost function of water utilities. When one estimates water demand for a 
given community, it is quite natural to consider as explanatory variables 
data concerning its population (age, wealth), the city itself (size, density) 
and possibly the choice between direct and delegated management. 
According to the authors this method is potentially biased since the variable 
concerning ownership is certainly endogenous. The authors shows that the 
empirical investigation made by Reynaud and Thomas (2005) of the water 
industry in the South-West of France is the best available evidence of their 
theory. Reynaud and Thomas (2005) estimate the probability that direct or 
delegated management is chosen in the water supply. They use the standard 
explanatory variables (size, population density, industrial density), and, in 
addition, the quality of the network. As a parameter of a network quality 
they use the amount of leakage of water during the distribution stage. Since 
leakage occurs between the production stage and the distribution, a natural 
measure of network quality is the ratio of billed water to produced water. 
The results of Reynaud and Thomas (2005) are clear: the higher the ratio, 
the greater the probability that the municipally chooses direct management. 
According to Martimort-Sand-Zantman (2006), the empirical results of 
Reynaud and Thomas (2005) is consistent with their theory. The conclusion 
is that ownership structure is an endogenous variable, which depends, 
among other causes, on the quality of the network and of infrastructure. The 
better is this quality, the higher is the likely that the choice is the direct 
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management, the lower is this quality, the higher is the likely that the choice 
is the delegated management. 
 
4.3 WORLDWIDE EXPERIENCES OF PPPS IN THE WATER 
SECTOR  
Worldwide, only 5 per cent of the total world population is served by 
private sector in the water service supply, about 290 million people. Of 
these, 43 per cent are in Europe, 24 per cent in Asia and Oceania, 16 per 
cent in North America, 7 per cent in South America, and 10 per cent in other 
countries (source by Stephenson, 2005, p. 265). 
percentage of population served by private sector
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During the 1990s, private sector participation in water services provision 
increased worldwide. On the contrary, at the end of 1990s, multinationals 
started to exit from some contracts in developing countries in order to 
reduce their exposure to projects that are not profitable enough or too risky.  
Nevertheless, PPPs remain the main policy stance in many international 
operations. 
In the following section, we analyse how water sector is organized in 
some important European countries, in particular in England and Wales, in 
France, in Germany and in Italy. Some other experiences are also analysed, 
especially in Latin American countries. An analyses of the private 
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multinationals is also provided, in order to understand industrial 
relationships between private parties participating in the provision of water 
services. Finally, a comparison of the different water systems is provided, in 
order to understand the main differences in the regulation framework, in the 
ownership structure, in the finance and in the levels of government which 
are delegated to negotiate and to manage water services.  
 
4.3.1 The water sector in England and Wales 
In 1945, in England and in Wales there were more than 1,000 bodies 
involved in the supply of water services. Most of these were local 
authorities, in the form of inter-municipal operators, and a little group of 
private companies. These subjects were regulated by a simple price-cap 
formula, in order to guarantee them a maximum rate of return of 5%. 
In this way, planning for water resources was a highly localised activity 
with little co-ordination at either regional or national level. 
The Water Act 1973 established 10 new regional water authorities 
(RWAs) that would have managed water resources and the supply of water 
services on a fully integrated basis. The Water Act 1973 required the 
regional water authorities to operate on a cost recovery basis, with capital to 
meet investment requirements raised by borrowing from central government 
and revenue from services provided. Water authorities were obliged to 
operate on a cost recovery basis to ensure charges met their revenue 
requirements. There were no other sources of government subsidy. 
The tight fiscal controls applied by central government in the 1970s and 
1980s, due, largely, to instability in the world economy and the high levels 
of debt inherited by the water authorities, led to insufficient expenditure to 
meet the capital maintenance and investment requirements. 
In response, the government introduced some changes through the Water 
Act 1983. This led to some constitutional changes, reduced the role of local 
government in decision making and gave the authorities scope to access the 
private capital markets. 
 74
The reform involved a restructuring of the water system by separating the 
roles of regulation and provision of water services. It established three 
separate, independent bodies to regulate the activities of the water 
companies. These were: 
1. the National Rivers Authority (now succeeded by the Environment 
Agency, EA), for monitoring river and environmental pollution; 
2. the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), for monitoring water 
quality; 
3. the Office of Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT), to 
set the price regime that companies follow. 
On the other hand, the reform allowed the access of the private capital in 
the industry. Various arguments in favour of the private sector encouraged 
the reform: the private sector would have been more efficient, private 
companies would have been better able to finance the large investments 
needed and private sector would have created competition. The industry was 
reformed in 1989.  
Technically, the restructuring of the water sector involved the following 
stages. First of all, the creation of 10 limited companies, with shares owned 
by the government, and the transfer of assets and personnel of the 10 RWAs 
into the new created limited companies, which became owners of the entire 
water system and properties of the RWAs. Then the sign with the new 
companies of 25-year licence for sanitation and water supply. Finally, the 
entire capital of the companies was offered for sale and fully underwritten 
on the London Stock Exchange. The Government hold a so-called “golden 
share”: the 10 water companies were protected from takeover for 5 years. 
This prevented any individual or single company from controlling more 
than 15 % of voting shareholdings. The golden share ended in 1994.  
In order to ensure that the shares of the new limited companies would be 
attractive to investors in the stock market, the government took a number of 
steps in order to increase the profitability of the water companies. In this 
way it was guaranteed the full underwriting of the shares in the Stock 
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Exchange and the political success of the operation. In fact, before selling 
the shares, the government issued a significant public bond in order to 
cancel all of the long-term debt owed by the water and sewerage companies 
at a total cost of 4.9 bn of pounds (1989 prices). In addition, the government 
provided for a cash injection of 1.5 bn of pounds to the companies, known 
as the ‘green dowry’. Moreover, the companies were sold by issuing shares 
on the stock market, with special discounts. Finally, the initial price regime, 
set as a political act before OFWAT was established, was also extremely 
generous, and the companies were given special exemption from paying 
profits taxes.  
Each licence was granted for a period of at least 25 years from the sign. 
In this way, water companies were awarded their regional activity until 
2014. In 1991, OFWAT, that is responsible for ensuring that the companies 
were profitable, and for encouraging efficiency, inserted into company’s 
license a clause requiring that for the end of the licence a minimum ten-year 
notification period was given. In 2002 the minimum notification period was 
extended to 25 years. According to OFWAT, this clause provides 
companies with greater certainty, enabling them and their investors to plan 
more securely. According to OFWAT, a competitive tender can create 
increasing uncertainty in the water companies and this uncertainty could 
affect the cost and availability of finance to companies, to the detriment of 
consumers.  
The following table shows the ownership of the 23 private water 
companies in England and Water operating at March 2007. Only 6 of them 
are listed at the London Stock Exchange, while 8 companies are controlled 
by international Private Equity Funds and other multinationals. The two 
larger world water multinationals, the French Suez and Veolia, owns 4 
companies. 
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Company Owner Country Type 
of 
owner 
Comments 
Anglian Water Osprey/AWG UK PE Consortium of PE funds 
Northumbrian 
Water 
Controlled by PE 
and banks 
UK SEC 25% owned by Ontario Teachers 
Pensions, 15% by fund managers 
Amvescap, 5% by Barclays Bank 
North West 
Water 
United Utilities UK SEC United Utilities is a quotated 
company  
Severn Trent 
Water 
Severn Trent UK SEC Severn Trent is a quotated 
company 
Southern Water Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
UK PE Owned by SWC: RBS owns 49% 
of SWC (PPI Investments is other 
main shareholder). 
South West 
Water 
Pennon Group UK SEC Pennon is 30% owned by 5 
financial investors 
Thames Water Macquarie Australia PE  
Welsh Water Glas Cymru UK NPC  
Wessex Water YTL Malaysia M  
Yorkshire Water Kelda UK SEC Two PE investors buy 7% stakes in 
April 2007 
Bournemouth and 
West Hampshire 
Water 
Biwater UK P Private company, operates 
internationally, but not in EU 
outside UK. 
Bristol Water Agbar/Suez ES/FR M  
Cambridge Water Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure 
Hong 
Kong 
M  
Cholderton 
Water 
Cholderton Estate UK P Private family owned 
Dee Valley - UK SEC 35% of shares owned by Axa SA. 
Folkestone and 
Dover  
Veolia FR M  
Mid Kent Water UTA and HDF Australia PE Utilities Trust of Australia (UTA); 
Hastings Diversified Utilities Fund 
(HDF).  
Portsmouth 
Water 
South Downs 
Capital 
UK PE  
South East Water UTA and HDF Australia PE Utilities Trust of Australia (UTA); 
Hastings Diversified Utilities Fund 
(HDF). 
South 
Staffordshire 
Water 
Arcapita Bank Bahrein PE Formerly known as First Islamic 
Investment Bank 
Sutton & East 
Surrey Water 
Aqueduct Capital DE PE Aqueduct Capital is part of 
Deutsche Bank. 
Tendring 
Hundred 
Veolia FR M   
Three Valleys Veolia FR M  
England and Wales: Water Company ownership, March 2007 (Type of owner: SEC = stock 
exchange quoted (UK); M = multinational; PE=private equity; NPC=not-for-profit 
company; P= privately owned company) 
Source: Hall D., Lobina E (2007). 
 
A price cap system operates on the assumption that the regulator 
(OFWAT), gathering information about firms, can set an upper limit on 
price increases that allows an efficient company to finance its functions. 
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Price caps are calculated and set in advance by the regulator every five years 
in the Periodic Review process. In order to calculate the price caps, the 
regulator employs econometric models and detailed assessments of 
individual company performance to identify potential reductions in 
operating, capital maintenance, and capital enhancement expenditure 
(Ofwat, 1998).  
Potential efficiency gains are determined also through the relative 
comparison of companies performance. In theory, the profit is constraint 
between the price cap regulation and the possible efficiency gains. The 
scope for opportunistic behaviour of firms is, in theory, diminished through 
the practice of comparative competition. In fact, allowed prices increases 
are calculated not as a function of its own actions, but rather in relation to 
all other firms performance. Competition, whether direct or simulated, is 
assumed to be a better driver of efficiency rather than regulation, legislation, 
or moral suasion. 
In its original form, price cap regulation was intended to minimize 
regulatory activity, with relatively small information requirements. The 
companies price limits were to be set by the regulator once every ten years. 
In theory, the key features of the British system were the following: little 
regulatory interference; a relatively long period between regulatory 
interventions; the capping of prices, rather than dividends; and the creation 
of a system of indicators, or “yardsticks”, which allows simulated 
competition amongst companies. Efficiency incentives should arise because 
companies are allowed to retain any profit made after price caps have been 
set.  
Unfortunately, actual results have been different from expectations.  
According to Lobina-Hall (2001), in the first 4 years, on average prices 
rose by over 50%. The first 9 years produced an average increase of 102%, 
of 46% in real terms, adjusted for inflation, with some companies having an 
increase of 75% in real terms. 
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  89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 % rise 
89/90
-
98/99 
Anglian cash 157 178 205 226 244 259 272 279 282 288 84% 
 Real terms 217 224 247 264 280 289 294 294 288 288 33% 
DwrCymru cash 149 169 197 218 237 255 263 272 281 294 98% 
 Real terms 206 214 237 255 272 285 284 287 287 294 43% 
NorthWest cash 111 125 143 156 170 182 194 208 221 234 111% 
 Real terms 153 157 172 182 195 204 210 219 226 234 53% 
Northumbri
an 
cash 108 123 148 160 177 188 197 207 216 229 112% 
 Real terms 149 155 178 186 203 210 213 218 221 229 53% 
SevernTre
nt 
cash 107 122 139 153 166 181 189 200 208 222 108% 
 Real terms 148 153 168 178 190 203 205 211 213 222 50% 
SouthWes
t 
cash 147 165 194 231 268 304 318 329 339 354 142% 
 Real terms 203 208 234 270 308 340 344 347 347 354 75% 
Southern cash 124 138 161 173 183 197 214 229 244 257 107% 
 Real terms 172 174 194 202 210 220 231 241 249 257 49% 
Thames cash 101 114 130 141 153 163 174 182 190 201 99% 
 Real terms 140 144 156 164 176 182 188 192 194 201 44% 
Wessex cash 139 155 178 193 210 223 234 243 252 265 91% 
 Real terms 192 196 215 225 241 249 253 257 258 265 38% 
Yorkshire cash 123 136 155 166 179 192 204 213 216 226 84% 
 Real terms 170 172 187 194 206 215 221 225 221 226 33% 
England&
Wales 
cash 120 135 156 171 186 199 210 221 229 242 102% 
 Real terms 166 170 188 199 213 223 228 233 234 242 46% 
Average  annual household water bills, by company. 
Real terms = adjusted to 1998/99 prices using RPI deflator .  E & W totals include water 
only companies 
Source: OFWAT Memorandum 18 March 1998, in House of Commons Research paper 98/117 
December 1998 
 
Actual costs in the period 1990–1995 were significantly lower than 
expected, and the profits resulted higher then expected levels.  
Generally, the companies tend to overestimate the forecasted capital 
expenditure, which is used to calculate the allowed price rises. In this way, 
the actual expenditure is lower than the expected, and the higher revenues 
insure higher profits. The same case occurs when many companies 
deliberately cut their investment programmes and use the savings to 
maintain or increase their dividends.  
The following table shows how the main components of the household 
bill for England and Wales have changed from the beginning of the reform. 
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Components of the average household bill, 1991-2010 (2003-04 prices) 
Source: OFWAT (2006). 
 
Operating costs as a proportion of household bills are declining slowly, 
while capital charges (current cost depreciation and the infrastructure 
renewals charge) have risen. Business taxes were negligible until the mid-
1990, but then they have risen because of the end of taxes exemption. The 
return on capital is split into two components; interest payments and profit 
attributable to shareholders. Interest payments have risen sharply as debt has 
become a major element of company finances. This means that investment 
is financed by debt or by prices increasing.  
In this framework, only a few years from the water reform of 1989 the 
regulator decided to reduce the price review from ten to five years, in order 
to readjust price limits. This decision of OFWAT was a response to the 
difficulty of accurate forecasting over even a relatively short period of time.  
Information requirements grew substantially, with OFWAT making 
implicit decisions on the acceptable real rates of return on capital employed 
in order to arrive at price limit determinations. Rather than being an end-
point of regulation, price caps have become a means to the end of regulating 
rates of return, via intense scrutiny of and negotiation over the “true” cost of 
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capital for companies. The light regulation foreseen was changed in the  
tighter regulation with respect to any other industry.  
As a result, the regulator began to analyse more deeply the companies’ 
investment programs. In 1998, the Competition Act provided a stronger 
power to the regulator in order to force water companies to cut their prices 
in case of an “excessive” rate of return. In this way, the price limits 
announced by OFWAT in 1999 for the year 2000–2001 reduced bills by an 
average of 12.4% in real terms (Ofwat, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the impact of the price cap reduction, and earlier 
interventions by the regulator to prevent companies from taking up their full 
price cap, called into question the robustness of the efficiency incentives as 
originally designed. In fact, the fear of expropriation of profits undermines 
companies’ incentive to maximize efficiency.  
The cut in price caps announced in 1999 implied a drop in revenues for 
most water companies, and a consequent drop in profits. Following the 
announcement of the final Periodic Review determinations in mid-1999, 
share prices lost 50% of their value. 
 
Share prices, UK water sector and FTSE all share 
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The paradox was that, as a result, by 2000, many water companies had 
greater difficulty in financing their investment programs. 
According to Bakker (2003b), given the difficulty of sourcing finance 
and the perceived future low-growth opportunities in the domestic market, 
water companies decided to refocus their activity outside of the core, 
regulated business.  
Soon after the 1999 Periodic Review, various water companies proposed 
for the separation between assets ownership and operations. In this way, 
similar to a lease contract adopted in France, the owner of water networks is 
responsible of the implementation of the investment program, while a long-
term lease contracts can be made to private companies to operate only water 
provision services. According to the water companies, one motivation to 
reorganizing the system stems from the difficulty experienced by some 
companies in sourcing financing for future investment programs. Moreover, 
while facilities management companies typically have low profit margins, a 
service company is able to generate a higher rate of return on capital 
employed because of the presence of few assets, and is more attractive 
under the more stringent price caps imposed by the regulator. Finally, in the 
long-term the declining status of water infrastructure may be the key factor 
in companies’ desire to exit the asset ownership side of the business.21  
Many companies expressed an interest in restructuring asset ownership, 
by arguing that equity was an expensive source of finance, and that other 
sources of finance – in particular debt finance – were cheaper in the long-
term. In this way, one of the key justification for the water reform returns to 
be open to discussion. The argument that equity market were the better form 
of finance was based on the fact that, although more expensive than 
government debt, equity market creates pressure on managers to make 
efficiency gains which offset the increased cost of capital. Instead, it seems 
                                                 
21 Little of the asset stock in England and Wales is less than three decades old; much of it is 
older than fifty years.  In London, one in three kilometers of pipes is more than 100 years 
old (Bakker, 2003) 
 82
that any efficiency gain under private equity ownership would not be 
outweighed by the increase in the cost of capital.  
 
4.3.2 The water sector in France 
In France, water supply is a responsibility of municipalities. There are 
36,679 municipalities, each of which is responsible for its own water 
supply. Many municipalities, in particular the smaller ones, have created 
municipal associations in order to benefit from economies of scale. 
Nevertheless, in 2003 there were approximately 14900 water service 
providers (BIPE, 2005). The economic regulation of private service 
provision is undertaken purely by contract between the municipality and the 
provider. There is no national or regional regulatory agency in France that 
would approve tariffs and set contractual service standards. 
Although they are required to maintain ownership of the infrastructure, 
the municipalities can choose whether and how to delegate the management 
of the water services. Local municipalities may decide a direct or a 
delegated management.  
With the direct management, the community takes complete charge of 
investments and operation of water supply services, of the relations with 
users, invoicing and recovery. The staffs of the water authority are 
composed of municipal agents with a civil servant status. Today, this type of 
organization can be found only in small rural communities.  
Local public authorities may decide the delegated management, in order 
to engage a Public-Private Partnership. In this case, the relationship between 
the local municipality and the private sector can take different forms: a 
service contract ( affermage) where the municipality remains responsible to 
finance infrastructure, and a concession contract (girance), where the 
private operator is responsible for financing all new investments over the 
duration of the relationship. Typically, all these contracts specify the nature 
of expected services and the water pricing schemes (including price 
adjustment formula). 
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The service contract is the most common organizational form, usually 
awarded for a period of 7 to 12 years. As we have seen in the chapter 2, with 
the service contract the private provider is responsible for the current 
operations of the water utility; it collects tariff revenues from users and pays 
a special additional charge to the local community, which is included in the 
water rate determined by the contract. It has no obligation to invest in the 
infrastructure.  
On the other hand, in a concession contract, the private provider builds 
installations, operates them at its own expense and recovers its cost by 
billing water price. At the end of the contract, it will hand the network and 
installations back to the municipality. The concession contract implies a 
higher degree of risk for the operator to the extent that it is responsible for 
all the investment. However, the level of risk depends of course on the type 
of price regulation implemented.  
The participation of the private sector has progressively increased in 
France since the 20th century. For the water service, the market share (in 
terms of customers) of the private sector was 17% in 1938 and 44% in 1964. 
According to the French Ministry of Environment, it was around 80% in 
2001.  
Year 1938 1964 1975 1979 2001 
Public 83% 56% 50% 47% 20% 
Private 17% 44% 50% 57% 80% 
Evolution of the private participation in the water sector 
 
The main characteristic of the private sector is its oligopolistic form with 
three major companies: Véolia Group, through its subsidiary Générale des 
Eaux, Suez Group, through its subsidiary Lyonnaise des Eaux and SAUR 
(Bouygues group). They represent the quasi-totality (89%) of the private 
market (other private companies operate at a local level but their weight 
remains small). 
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Year 2001 
VEOLIA 51,1% 
SUEZ 24,3% 
SAUR 13,1% 
Other  11,5% 
The French private water market 
 
We have seen that local communities directly carry out economic 
regulation of French water services. Contrary to other countries, in the case 
of private operation the government regulation is replaced by a contract 
between the private operator and the local community. In other words, 
regulation is based on the contract signed between the parties. Nevertheless, 
local municipalities are not always in a good position to exercise an efficient 
control over water service providers. The process of price setting is different 
whether the local community has chosen to delegate the service to a private 
firm or not. If the local community manages directly the water service, it 
can set the price of water by itself. If the local community has chosen to 
delegate water services to a private firm, the price is determined by 
projecting financial accounts provided by the operator. The relationship 
between the local municipality and the firm is formalized by means of a 
contract that specifies a price structure, a formula of price revision and 
clauses allowing for exceptional conditions. Since the bargaining power is 
in most of the case favourable to firms, the price structure is likely to reflect 
a monopolistic behaviour rather than social welfare maximization. In fact, 
the three large private water companies are in a stronger negotiation position 
than the municipalities, and there is almost no real competition in the sector. 
Hall (2002) reports that about 90% of contracts are renewed with the same 
company. Moreover, in a report of 2003, the French Supreme Audit Agency 
(the Cour des Comptes) noted that many municipalities, including some 
large ones, do not have the capacity to control the private sector contracts, in 
particular unjustified increases of certain fees. The municipalities do not use 
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the numerous legal instruments at their disposal to better control the 
contracts they sign. According to the Audit Agency, the annual financial 
reports submitted by the private companies to the municipalities are often 
not very transparent. For example, in many cases these reports cannot be 
compared to the financial projections submitted during contract negotiation, 
because they are formulated on different bases. Also, water companies are 
allowed to carry out works through their own subsidiaries without selecting 
them according to the local government regulations for competitive bidding. 
Finally, large utilities can manipulate transfer prices, thus making their 
finances even less transparent to municipal regulators.  
In order to strengthen competition, to fight corruption and to improve 
transparency in the water sector, in 1993 the French Parliament approved 
the “Sapin Law”. It limits the duration of the delegation contracts and 
imposes a procedure of publicity and consultation preliminary to the 
conclusion of delegation or renewal water contracts. This procedure 
includes a negotiation stage where the local communities must negotiate 
with one or more contractors in order to obtain specifications and detailed 
information about the content of their bids. 
The impact of the Sapin Law is reported in the table below.  
 
 
Impact of Sapin Law on delegation agreement renewal on the water sector  
Source: Guérin-Schneider and Lorrain (2004) 
 
The number of agreements leading to a change in operators remains 
low. In fact, in 80 to 90% of the cases, the existing operator is renewed for 
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another term. The number of offers received by local communities is still 
very low, 2.2 in 2001. In 28% of the cases, the local community receives 
only one offer, which means that ex-ante competition for the market is very 
weak. To summarize, the level of competition among private companies 
through the delegation contract bidding process is still low in France.  
 
4.3.3 The water sector in Germany 
In Germany, the responsibility of the regulation of water supply is shared 
among the Federal Government and the 16 Federal States (Laenders), within 
the framework of the E.U. laws. On the other hand, the organization and 
implementation of the water supply belongs to the traditional duties of the 
municipalities, in accordance with federal and regional water laws.  
Industry associations and professional associations also play an important 
role in self-regulating the water sector. In particular, the professional 
associations play an important role assisting in the development of technical 
norms.  
Some salient features of the sector compared to other developed 
countries are its very low per capita water use, the high share of advanced 
wastewater treatment and very low distribution losses. 
In Germany, there are about 12.320 municipalities, and about 6.000 
water operators, mainly publicly owned. Traditionally, municipalities 
organize the supply of water. Nevertheless, in the last twenty years many 
other organizational forms different from the traditional municipal 
departments have been developed and realized. The national water market is 
not dominated by multinationals, as is the case of France, but rather by a 
multitude of medium-sized enterprises and municipal companies. 
Municipalities are free to choose the organizational form of their water 
services, while the ownership of the water assets has to remain in their 
hands. They may decide, according to their political and economical 
preferences, if delegate or not water services and the degree of involvement 
of private parties.  
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In particular, a municipality may decide the direct management of the 
water services. In this case, we face the case of a fully public provision, as 
we have seen in the classification of the chapter 2, and the most common 
organizational forms are the following: 
- the municipal department, operated by the municipality within the 
scope of the municipal administration and bookkeeping; 
-  the municipal utility, operated by the municipality in a separate 
entity with independent bookkeeping; 
- the municipal company, with a private entity company (corporation) 
in the hands of the municipality. 
In alternative, the municipality can choose to involve private parties in 
engaging a Public-Private Partnership. In this case, the organizational forms 
may be the mixed capital firm, or joint company, with the creation of a 
private entity company owned by municipal and private parties, that is an 
institutional form of Public-Private Partnership. In alternative a service 
contract or a concession contract with a private owned firm, as defined in 
the chapter 2. 
 
Cooperation 
Sewage 
Associations
16%
Municipal 
utilities
31%
Other private 
entities 
4%
Operator/joint 
companies
9% Municipal 
departments
21%
Municipal 
companies
4%Other public 
entities
15%
 
Different forms of organisation in % of population. 
Source: German Federal Ministry  for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and 
Nuclear Safety (2001). 
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The figure depicts the various forms of organization of the water supply, 
in % of population served. It is worth notice that private participation covers 
only 13% of population. The voluntary cooperation between municipalities 
in water associations plays an important role, providing water to 16% of 
population. Nevertheless, public forms of organization serve more than 70% 
of population.  
The two most important IPPPs are Gelsenwasser and Berlinwasser. 
Gelsenwasser is quoted, and it is owned for the most part by the 
municipalities of Bochum and Dortmund (92%), by other municipalities 
(5%) and by the market (3%). It is a multi-utility (water, sanitation and 
natural gas distribution) serving 3.2 million inhabitants in North Rhine-
Westphalia, under concession agreements with 39 municipalities, and many 
other localities throughout Germany and internationally. It has expanded 
into Eastern Europe, in particular in Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic. 
Berlinwasser is a IPPP among the Lander of Berlin (50,1%), Veolia 
(24,95%) and RWE (24,95%). It provides water and sanitation services in 
Berlin, serving 3.5 million people. 
The technical and economical regulation of water management is based 
in Germany on the following instruments. 
The property of the water network is of the municipalities. The federal 
law imposes minimum requirement standards for the quality of drinking 
water and for technology and operation of plants. 
By law, price mechanisms for water supply are subject to the cost 
recovery principle, including capital replacement and the remuneration of 
equities. The municipalities are not responsible for price supervision, but 
rather the antitrust agency (which also regulates the supply of gas and 
electricity). 
 
4.3.4 Some experiences of South America 
During the last decade, Bolivia introduced PPPs in the water sector. In 1999, 
the municipality of Cochabamba organized the auction for the concession of 
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the water service. The only bidder to the auction was the consortium Aquas 
de Tunari, which was indirectly controlled from the American multinational 
Bechtel and the Italian AEM (owned by the municipality of Milan), trough 
the public company Edison. The contract assigned the concession of the 
water services for the duration of thirty years, with the right of extraction of 
water on every springs, including private ones. The consortium increased 
the tariff of 300%, and the cost of water became too high compared with a 
medium wage of the country. In some cases, a monthly water bill was 12$, 
with respect to a monthly wage of 60$. Moreover the cost of connection to 
the water network was charge in the bill, and the concession to the 
consortium forbids any free private use of alternative sources of water, that 
were the traditional way of local communities in provisioning themselves. 
In april 2000 a protest of thousands people, called water war, induced the 
government to abolish the water reform and to rescind the contract with the 
consortium, with the water service transferred to a company owned by the 
municipality. In 2002 the multinationals Bechtel and Edison recurred to the 
court of the ICSID (the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes of the World Bank) asking the government the payment of 25 
million dollars in compensation for damages. 
Also the government of Ecuador had some problems with private 
involvement in the water sector, too. In 2001 the Ecuadorian government, 
trough its owned company ECAPAG, signs with  Interagua C.Ltda, 
indirectly controlled by the multinational Bechtel, the contract of concession 
of the water services in the city of Guayaquil, the most populous city of 
Ecuador. Interagua changes the tariffs with an increase in 2006 of 400% 
respect to 2000. Though the high prices paid to the contractor, population 
begins a protest due to the low quality of the water, the frequent interruption 
of the service and the diffusion of cases of hepatitis in the city. In 2003 
Interagua obtains a loan of 40 million dollars from the Inter-American 
Development Bank, with the Ecuadorian government which guarantee the 
debt, in order to invest in the water infrastructure. 
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The case of Argentina is the following. In 1995, the government signed a 
thirty years concession contract with the company Aguas de Aconquija, 
controlled by the French Vivendi, for the water services in the northern 
region of Tucuman.  The tariffs increased of 100 %, while people began to 
complain the deterioration of the water quality. In 1996 a large protest of 
citizens (about 80% of bills were not paid in sign of protest) due to high 
tariffs and bed water quality, induced the government to recur to the 
provincial Court for contractual breach of the Vivendi. In 1997, the 
government rescinded the contract and began a phase of renegotiation with 
Vivendi. In 1998, the French company decided to abandon the concession 
contract, denouncing the government of changing the initial terms of the 
concession contract. Vivendi recurred to the court of ICSID asking the 
government the payment of 105 million dollars in compensation for 
damages. 
A similar proceeding is present at the ICSID between Argentine and 
Azurix Corporation (the water division of Enron Corporation ), for a 
concession contract regarding water services in the region of Buenos Aires. 
In this case, too, the contractor claims a compensation of 156 million dollar 
for the break of the concession in 2002 due to the unilateral decision of the 
government. 
 
4.3.5 The Italian water system 
A structural reform of the Italian water sector has begun in 1994 with the so 
called  Galli Law.22 At that time, the sector was highly fragmented, poorly 
planned, and somewhere even extremely inefficient. Small public 
companies and municipal departments were the prevalent organisational 
model, with about 8000 water suppliers. Tariffs were set well below the cost 
recovery level, causing almost no investment and a general worsening of the 
public budgets. As a result of the Galli Law, a slow process of consolidation 
                                                 
22 Law n. 36 of 5 January 1994. 
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and industrialisation has taken place. There have also been substantial 
changes in the regulatory governance. Nevertheless, after 14 years, the 
reform is not yet fully completed. 
The new organisational model is based on some key points:  
1) separation of the role of planning and regulating the sector (assigned to 
the public authorities of Regions) from that of operating it (delegated to a 
totally separated entity);  
2) territorial integration of homogeneous areas into new administrative 
divisions at the sub-regional level, called ATOs;23 
3) full cost recovery through tariffs and financial self-sufficiency.  
The chosen model is the concession contract. The AATO has to delegate 
the responsibility of both operations and investment to a single operator. 
Nevertheless, every AATO is free to choose the property regime of the 
water operator: its capital may be public, private or mixed. However, in 
every case it has to follow European rules on procurement. In fact, when a 
private entity is involved, the AATO has to select the private partner 
through competitive auctions based on the most economically advantageous 
offer. Direct delegation may can only occur if the company is fully public, 
recurring the case of in-house provision, as we have seen in the chapter 2. 
More precisely, the water law in linked to the Public Local Services Law. 
According to the Law 267/2000 (article 113), the AATOs may organize the 
water service through the delegation to a provider in three different way: 
1. procurement of the service to a private firm, through a public tender, 
according to the procurement laws of the European Union; 
2. direct delegation to a so called in-house company, entirely publicly 
owned; 
3. direct delegation to a mixed company, with a public selection of the 
private partner.  
                                                 
23 AATO is the acronym for Autorità d’Ambito Territoriale Ottimale. 
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 Substantial freedom is left to the AATO in choosing the actual details of 
the agreement with the water provider. The main decision variables are: the 
length of the concession; the nature and strength of the control on 
performance; the informational obligations; the allocation of risks, 
especially investment overruns and revenue fluctuations; the system of 
penalties for underperformance; the procedural aspects of contractual 
adjustment, dispute resolution and asset valuation at contract termination. 
The following table shows the situation of the AATOs in the 2007.  
 Organizational form 
Regions Number  
Of 
Existing 
ATOs 
ATOs  
with 
a selected
provider 
Number 
of  
providers 
Traditional 
Procurement
to a private 
firm 
IPPPs Public Firms 
(in house) 
Other forms
Piemonte  6 6 29  7 17 5
Val D'Aosta  1             
Lombardia  12 6 11   1 10   
Veneto  8 7 12   1 11   
Friuli Venezia Giulia  4 1 1     1   
Liguria  4 2 5   1 4   
Emilia Romagna  9 9 10   9 1   
Toscana  6 6 6   5 1   
Umbria  3 3 3   2 1   
Marche  5 4 6   1 5   
Lazio  5 4 4 1 2 1   
Abruzzo  6 6 6     6   
Molise  1             
Campania  4 2 2   1 1   
Puglia  1 1 1     1   
Basilicata  1 1 1     1   
Calabria  5 3 3     2 1
Sicilia  9 5 5 4 1     
Sardegna  1 1 1     1   
Ato Lemene  1             
Total 92 67 106 5 31 64 6
North 45 31 68 0 19 44 5
Centre  19 17 19 1 10 8 0
South 28 19 19 4 2 12 1
The situation of Italian AATOs, year 2007. Source COVIRI, 2008 
 
Of the existing 92 AATOs, 67 of them have delegated the water service 
to the provider, which represents the 73% of the total cases. It is worth 
notice that the Galli Law was adopted in 1994, and, at the present, it is not 
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yet totally completed, especially in the south of the State! Moreover, the 
number of water providers is 106, which means that some AATOs have 
chosen more than one provider. The table shows also the organizational 
forms chosen by the AATOs.   
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Organizational forms in Italy 
 
The figure shows that the most important organizational forms chosen by 
the AATOs are the solution of in-house provision through a public firm 
(60%) and the Institutional Public-Private Partnership (29%). The traditional 
procurement to an entirely private firm is a residual form (5%).  
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The previous figure shows that the institutional Public-Private 
Partnership is the preferred solution in the central regions, while in the other 
regions it’s prevalent the model of the public firms. In the northern regions 
the reform has been quite completely implemented, while this is not so in 
the rest of the State. 
During 2007, the COVIRI sent out a questionnaire to the AATOs, in 
order to know the entity of investment plans in water sector. The analysis is 
partial, because some AATOs did not answer. Nevertheless, the sample 
analysed gives the following results. 
First, every AATO prepares a plan of investment necessary to its water 
network, and the provider should realize this plan. Nevertheless, in the years 
from 2003 to 2005 only 49 % of the planned investment has been realized 
by the water providers. We have analysed if there is a difference between 
the various forms of organization, and the better performance is achieved by 
the IPPP (mixed capita firms).  
26%
54%
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public f irms mixed f irms
% of investmend realized with respect to the 
initial plan (2003-2005).
 
 
In fact, on average, as the previous figure depicts, the public firms and 
mixed firms realized, respectively, 26% and 54% of the planned investment.  
A second aspect analysed by COVIRI is the structure of the planned 
financing of the water providers in order to realize the planned investment. 
The following table shows that the prevalent form of financing investment is 
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the self-financing. In fact, on average a water provider finance 58% of its 
planned investment with self financing.  
structure of planned financing for investment average 
self-financing 58% 
Debt 23% 
transfers from E.U. 16% 
capital increase 2% 
transfers from municipalities 1% 
Other 1% 
      Source: COVIRI 2008 
 
In other words, firms plan to finance investment through the revenue 
deriving from the tariffs charged to consumers. The other forms of funding 
are the debt and the public transfers deriving from the European 
Community, which on average represent 23% and 16%, respectively. 
Capital increase and transfers from municipalities are only a marginal case. 
We have analysed the differences between public and mixed firm on the 
data of the questionnaire of COVIRI. The result is that a strong difference 
between public and mixed firm arises in financing investment. Self-
financing is the 70% of the planned financing of mixed firms, while it is the 
52% in the public firms. Moreover, mixed firms use debt and European 
funds only for 16% and 6%, with respect to 26% and 20% of public firms. 
 
structure of planned financing to 
realize investment 
average public 
firms 
Mixed 
firms 
self-financing 58% 52% 70% 
Debt 23% 26% 16% 
transfers from E.U. 16% 20% 6% 
capital increase 2% 0% 6% 
transfers from municipalities 1% 1% 1% 
other 1% 1% 1% 
     Our elaboration on COVIRI 2008 
 
The result is that mixed firms prefer the use of self-financing more than 
public firms in their plans, and are not disposable to increase debt with 
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respect to public firms. The following figure shows how prevalent is self-
financing in the mixed firms with respect to the public firms. 
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Structure of planned funding of public and mixed firms. 
 
The following table shows the financial structure of public and mixed 
firms realized after the first three years of management, with respect to the 
structure planned at the beginning date. 
 
structure of funding public firms mixed firms 
 planned  realized planned  realized 
self-financing 52% 39% 70% 60% 
debt 26% 17% 16% 10% 
transfers from E.U. 20% 42% 6% 8% 
capital increase 0% 1% 6% 16% 
transfers from municipalities 1% 1% 1% 5% 
other 1% 0% 1% 1% 
Structure of funding, our elaboration on COVIRI 2008 
 
 Public firms report a realized self-financing and debt value lower than 
planned, while the component of E.U. transfers is more than double with 
respect to the plans. Also mixed firms report a realized self-financing value 
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lower than planned. This means that public firms, while reporting high 
percentage of self-financing and debt, actually tend to finance investment 
for the most part throughout European financial resources.  
The market structure of the Italian water sector has been elaborated using 
the data set of COVIRI (2008) and of Italian Antitrust Agency (2007). 
The following table shows the most important water company in Italy.  
 
Firm Served population % 
ACEA spa           8.200.243  14,62% 
Acquedotto Pugliese spa           4.019.566  7,16% 
Hera spa           2.528.283  4,51% 
Smat Torino spa           2.153.258  3,84% 
Metropolitana Milanese spa           2.461.534  4,39% 
Iride spa           1.183.267  2,11% 
Enia spa           1.110.740  1,98% 
Arin Napoli              980.000  1,75% 
A2A spa (ex Asm Brescia)              908.726  1,62% 
Veolia              700.000  1,25% 
Acegas-Aps spa              470.184  0,84% 
Suez              244.519  0,44% 
other operators         31.147.202  55,51% 
Total         56.107.522  100,00% 
Source: our elaboration using data COVIRI 2008 and AGCM (2007). 
 
 
Acquedotto Pugliese spa, Smat Torino spa, Metropolitana Milanese spa 
and Arin spa are public firms, serving the region of Puglia and the 
municipality of Turin, Milan, and Naples, respectively. Suez and Veolia are 
the two most important water multinationals. The other firms are 
institutional Public-Private Partnerships. Acea spa, Hera spa, Iride spa, Enia 
spa, A2A spa and Acega-Aps spa are Public-Private Partnerships in the 
form of mixed capital firms involving the most important municipalities 
(Rome, Bologna, Genoa, ReggioEmilia-Parma-Piacenza, Milan and 
Brescia…). All these mixed capital firms are quoted at the Milan Stock 
Exchange, while local municipalities own the majority of the capital 
(>50%). 
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Acea spa is the most important water company in Italy, serving about 
15% of population. Moreover, if we consider only the water market opened 
to the private partnerships, Acea serves more than 50% of this population. 
Acea is a mixed capital company, where the Municipality of Rome owns 
51% of shares, while 9% is owned by Suez, its operative private partner. 
The remaining part is owned by Asset Management Companies and by the 
market.  
Municipality of 
Rome
51%
Floating
28%
Suez
9%
Caltagirone
3%
Pictet Asset 
Management
4%
Schroders Inv. Ltd
5%
 
  Source: Acea spa, Group Balance Sheet, 2007. 
 
Acea spa is the water provider not only of the city of Rome. In fact, from 
the beginning of the Italian reform, its strategy has been to expand in the 
Italian water industry, and the following figure shows the presence of the 
company in many parts of Italy. 
We have seen that Acea spa is an IPPP between the municipality of 
Rome, which owns 51% of shares, and private parties, in particular SUEZ 
and asset management funds. The controlled company Acea Ato 2 spa, is 
owned by Acea spa (96,46%) and by the municipalities of the ATO 2 Rome. 
In this way, Acea Ato 2 spa is an IPPP between the municipalities of the 
ATO 2 Rome, including the city of Rome, and private partners, where the 
municipality of Rome indirectly owns the major part of the shares.  
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The nature of mixed firm of ACEA spa is because it is a multi utility 
operating in the municipality of Rome. Nevertheless, with its strategy of 
expansion, ACEA, and indirectly the municipality of Rome, is become the 
industrial partner of other municipalities belonging to other ATOs. For 
example, ACEA owns 37% of GORI  SPA, which provides water services 
in the region of Campania (ATO 4 – Sele). The remaining 63% is owned by 
the municipalities of the ATO 4-Campania Sele. In this case, GORI SPA is 
an IPPP between public municipalities and a private party, that is Acea, 
which is indirectly controlled by the municipality of Rome! In other words,  
we can say that the municipality of Rome indirectly controls water provision 
of 12 % of Italian population! The question is the following: what is the 
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objective of the municipality of Rome in controlling water provision of 
municipalities that are not in its electoral boundary?  
 The following facts perhaps may highlights on the behaviour of the 
management of Acea in its expanding strategy. Acea at the present owns 
indirectly 40% of Publiacqua spa, an IPPP with local municipalities 
(including the city of Florence) for the provision of water services in the 
ATO 3 Toscana-Medio Valdarno. The participation is owned through its 
controlled company Acque Blu Fiorentine spa, where it owns 68,5% of 
shares while SUEZ owns 22,83%. SUEZ, the France Company, works in the 
Italian water sector both directly and indirectly through its controlled 
companies. During 2006, the AGCM24 (the Italian Antitrust) applied a 
penalty to ACEA and SUEZ due to the violation of the article 81 of the EC 
Treaty, which forbids agreement between firms consisting into limit market 
competition. According to the Italian Antitrust, a hidden agreement exists 
between the two companies ACEA and SUEZ, which are direct competitors 
in the Italian water market, in order to coordinate their commercial 
strategies and to share the water concessions of the ATOs. According to the 
AGCM, this agreement has conditioned quite 25 per cent of Public-Private 
Partnerships created at national level. The two companies have concerted 
their participation to many auctions for water concessions and for the entry 
in PPPs with local municipalities, initiating with the region of Toscana. 
After all, though the agreement is hidden, the relationship between ACEA 
and SUEZ is formalized by the participation of SUEZ in 9 per cent of the 
capital of ACEA, and by the fact that SUEZ directly chooses two of the nine 
members of the Board. In particular, AGCM demonstrated that SUEZ 
offered in France its abstention in the auctions where ACEA was interested. 
On the othe hand, in Italy a documentation exists where SUEZ offered its 
abstention in the auction for the water concession of the ATO 5 – Lazio 
                                                 
24 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato. 
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Frosinone, won by ACEA, while ACEA offered its abstention in the auction 
for the choice of a private partner of the municipality of Livorno.  
However, we have analyzed the link existing among the most important 
Italia water providers, as we can see in the following figure. 
 
The analyses confirm the presence of a cooperation between SUEZ and 
ACEA, but also many links between ACEA and Veolia. 
The effect of these agreements is a limitation of competition in the Italian 
water sector, which was in a delicate moment of transition due to the reform 
of 1994. A limitation of competition is also evident by the analyses of 
Anwandter-Rubino (2006). 
The authors show that in the last tenders of AATOs for the research of a 
private partner, the average number of bids has been 1.1.  
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Kind of tender Number of tenders in 
 the sample 
Average duration in 
years of the concession 
Average number 
of bids 
Research of  
private partner 
12 26,3 1,1 
Private  
concession 
10 28,0 1,1 
 
TOTAL 22 27,1 1,1 
Source: Anwandter-Rubino (2006) 
 
In the following paragraph, we will see that the case of collusion is 
spread at international level, too. Moreover, we will see that also some cases 
of corruption are present in some part of Italy involving private partners. 
 
4.3.6 Private corporations involved in PPPs in the water sector 
The water business is dominated by the two largest French multinationals, 
Suez and Veolia (ex Vivendi), who together hold about 70% of the 
international private participation in the water business. The following 
figure compares sales of these two and the other largest companies in the 
2001. 
Water sales, 2001 (€millions), Hall (2002), modified.
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Other large international operators are the German RWE and another French 
multinational, the Bouygues-Saur.  
In the last years, a process of concentration is in act, notably with a series 
of recent takeovers of US companies.  Suez bought US Water, which was 
owned by Bechtel, and United Utilities, and a number of Azurix contracts in 
Mexico.  
Moreover, the most important private corporations are suspected of a 
collaboration in order to reduce competition and to dominate the water 
market. In fact, as reported in Hall (2002), in 2002 the French Antitrust 
Authority (Conseil de la Concurrence) ruled that Suez, through its 
controlled companie Lyonnaise des Eaux, and Veolia-Vivendi, through its 
controlled companies Generale des Eaux, had been abusing their market 
dominance in France, where they control more then 70 % of the private 
water sector.  The two companies had created joint subsidiaries in a number 
of towns and regions, so that they were sharing the profits of a number of 
water concessions instead of competing against each other: 12 joint ventures 
in France were listed, including cities such as Marseilles and Lille – two 
involving SAUR as well. The council also said that since June 1997 more 
than 40 tenders had been made uncompetitive by the groups’ behavior. As 
we have seen in the previous paragraph, also Italian Antitrust charged SUEZ 
and ACEA for the same reasons.  
These forms of trusts are not a local case, but it is an international 
phenomenon. The following figure shows a number of links between the 
major international companies. 
It is worth to notice that even the nearest competitors to Suez and Veolia-
Vivendi (RWE, SAUR, and Anglian) are interested in many partnerships 
with Suez and Veolia-Vivendi, in order to establish themselves in the 
market.  RWE/Thames for example are partners to Vivendi on three of their 
major water operations – Berliner Wasserbetribe, Budapest Sewearge 
(FCSM), and United Water in Adelaide, Australia, and its offshoots in New 
Zealand (Papakura) and Indonesia (Sidoarjo).   
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Joint ventures between leading water multinationals 
Source: PSIRU database, 2002. Generated by V.Popov using Social Network Analysis 
software, reported in Hall (2002).                       
 
RWE is also a partner to Suez in Budapest Water. SAUR has 
partnerships with Vivendi in both the UK and the Czech republic.  Anglian 
is a partner of both Suez and Vivendi in Aguas Argentinas, and separately 
of Vivendi and Suez in the Czech Republic.  
In Italy we have seen in the previous paragraph the link between SUEZ, 
Veolia and ACEA. 
However, a number of convictions for bribery involving managers of 
subsidiaries of both SUEZ and Veolia, in order to obtain water contract, 
supports the suspicion of collaboration between multinational corporations. 
The following table lists some of the most significant recent convictions. 
Some details of these convictions are the following. In France, in 1991, 
the mayor of Ostwald resigned after receiving paybacks from Vivendi, Saur 
and Suez. He claimed the payments were ‘normal’ and that other officials 
received similar cutbacks. 
 
 
 105
Year of 
conviction 
Country Location  Corporation 
2008 Italy Calabria Veolia 
2008 Italy Latina Veolia 
2001 USA New Orleans  Veolia 
2001 USA Bridgport  Veolia 
2001 Italy Milan Veolia 
1996 France Grenoble Suez 
1996 France Angouleme Veolia 
1996 France Réunion Veolia 
1991 France Ostwald Veolia 
 
In 1995, in Grenoble, a senior executive of Lyonnaise des Eaux (Suez) 
received prison sentences for taking and giving bribes to award the water 
contract to a subsidiary of Lyonnaise des Eaux. The bribes were over $2.8 
million. In 1996, two senior Vivendi executives were convicted of bribing 
the mayor of St. Denis in order to obtain a water contract after admitting in 
court in October 1996 that Vivendi had financed elected officials in order to 
obtain a water concession. The two senor executive managers were found 
guilty of bribery in at least 70 cities throughout France. 
In USA, Professional Services Group (PSG), purchased by Vivendi in the 
mid-1990s, signed the contract to operate New Orleans water service in 
1992. A PSG executive and a member of the New Orleans Sewerage and 
Water Board were convicted in connection with bribery charges as PSG was 
seeking an extension to that contract.  
In Italy, in 2001, a senior manager in Vivendi’s water division was 
convicted for bribery and received a prison sentence in connection with a 
bribe paid to the president of the Milan city council during the bidding 
procedure for the contract for a wastewater treatment plant in the south of 
Milan. In January 2008, part of the top management of Acqualatina spa was 
arrested for corruption. Acqualatina spa is an institutional Public-Private 
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Partnership between the municipalities of Latina, which own 51%, and the 
multinational Veolia, which owns 49%. The charge is that, because the 
company is an IPPP, with public authorities involved, every operation of 
contracting-out is subject to a competitive tender, in respect to the European 
and national procurement law. The Court demonstrated that, though they 
had the majority, public managers did not prevent private managers from 
contracting-out, without public tenders, many services and construction 
contracts to the subsidiaries of the private partner, Veolia. The same top 
managers, imposed by Veolia, are charged of corruption for the same 
reasons in the company Sorical spa, that is an IPPP between the Regional 
Authority of Calabria (53,5%) and Veolia (46,5%), operating in the 
Calabria’s water services. 
These cases show the presence of a difficulty in the IPPP to stop private 
cross-subsidies from private partners. The cash surplus deriving from water 
revenues may be drained by the parent companies of the private partners, 
which then give generous dividends to their private shareholders. This case 
of “milking the cow” of water to finance other activities is used in particular 
by multinational corporations and by multi-utility companies.  
One of the phenomenons of the last ten years is the exit of some 
multinationals from the water contract of some developing countries. The 
reason is the need to reduce their exposure to projects that are not profitable 
enough or too risky.  
More precisely, over the period 2001-2004, water multinationals have 
limited their investment in developing countries. According to Izaguirre-
Hunt (2005), RWE-Thames announced that it would withdraw from most 
regions while focusing on Central and Eastern Europe, while Veolia 
announced that it would concentrate on selected Asian countries, and Suez 
that it would pull out of Asia and Latin America. 
The question of the provision of water services and infrastructure in poor 
developing countries is a key issue of the model of Public-Private 
Partnerships. The World Bank insists that private sector involvement is 
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possible also in developing countries, but multinationals do not share this 
optimism.  
Hall (2002) reports the results of the World Bank Water Division of 
January 2002. The Water Division stated that the private sector has no 
incentive to invest in developing countries. Moreover, the chief executive of 
SAUR rejected some common beliefs about the role of the private sector as 
an investor in developing countries. In these countries, a problem exists of 
compatibility between regulation and profitability and of feasibility of the 
cost recovery. He concluded that subsidies and soft loans are essential in 
developing countries in order to sustain water investment in infrastructure. 
He warned that tighter contracts and regulation make things worse from a 
business perspective: the general increase in risk was made worse by 
“[u]nreasonable contractual constraints …. Unreasonable Regulator power 
and involvement”.  Finally, he rejected the possibility of cost recovery from 
users:  “water pays for water is no longer realistic in developing countries: 
Even Europe and the US subsidise services….Service users can’t pay for the 
level of investments required, not for social projects…”25 
The solutions to these problems, in his view, is the presence of public 
subsidies, soft loans and guarantees. The role of the World Bank should be  
to coordinate the supply of these soft loans and subsidies, tell developing 
countries what to do, and act as a partner to private companies.  
His final statement was that, without these subsidies and soft loans 
coordinated by the World Bank, the multinationals would exit from the 
water contracts of the developing countries.  
 
                                                 
25  ‘Is the Water Business Really a Business?’ Mr J.F.Talbot, CEO Saur International World 
Bank Water and Sanitation Lecture Series 13th February 2002  
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/B-SPAN/docs/SAUR.pdf 
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4.4 A COMPARISON OF THE DIFFERENT NATIONAL WATER 
SYSTEMS 
In this section, we make a comparison between the national water system of 
England and Wales, France, Germany and Italy. We are interested in 
particular in analyzing and comparing the following four points: the 
regulation framework, the ownership structure, the government levels 
involved and their contractual power, the tariff setting and the way 
investment in water infrastructure are financed.  
 
4.4.1 The regulation framework 
In analysing the water system of the four countries, we can observe two 
main regulation models adopted by England and by France, the regulation 
by independent authority and the regulation by contract, respectively. In the 
cases of Germany and Italy, a mixed model is adopted.  
The model of regulation by independent authority is based on a unique 
national authority, independent from national and local governments, which 
promotes a homogeneous regulation of the national water sector. The model 
of regulation by contract does not include any national regulator, because 
every duty and obligation is regulated by the contract signed between 
parties. This model is characterized by a local dimension of regulation.  
In particular, the following figure depicts the English regulation 
structure. 
A strong central framework characterizes the model, with a national 
regulator that is the Department of Environment, and its offices of DWI and 
OFWAT, which deal with the technical and economic regulation, 
respectively. Local Authorities have a little responsibility, and a clear 
separation between regulators and regulated firms is able to eliminate every 
conflict of interest.   
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The Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) has 
overall responsibility for all aspects of water supply, water resources 
management and the water regulatory systems. It prepares the water 
legislation, and sets the legal framework for drinking water quality, 
environmental, and customer service standards, which the undertakers must 
deliver and the OFWAT must enforce. The Conditions of Appointment 
(often referred to as the “Licence”) were granted by the Department of 
Environment in 1989. The Licence imposes conditions on the companies, 
which are enforced by the economic regulator, that is the Office of Water 
Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT). OFWAT is the economic 
regulator of the water sector. Its mission is to regulate water sector in a way 
that provides incentive and encourages the private companies to achieve a 
world-class service in terms of quality for customers. Its choices are made 
independently of the Government. OFWAT directly enforce the licences 
awarded to the water companies, and set a regulation framework in order to 
limit price increases, to improve water services, to encourage companies to 
be more efficient and to guarantee standards of service. It is worth notice 
that water licences impose to the water companies the respect of the national 
Conditions of 
Appointment 
(Licence) 
Water Provider 
Department of  Environment  
(DEFRA) 
DWI 
OFWAT 
Competition  
Commission 
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regulation of procurement of services in the public sector if they chooses to 
contracting out part of their services. The Drinking Water Inspectorate 
(DWI) is the office of DEFRA which carries out technical audits of water 
undertakers and initiates enforcement action in case of contraventions of the 
water standards. 
Finally, the Competition Commission has the role of ‘court of appeal’ for 
both the water companies and the DEFRA. A company may appeal against 
the decision of DEFRA in case of disagreement of the five-yearly review of 
K factors or of interim adjustments of tariffs. 
The Competition Commission also plays a role in the event of a merger 
or acquisition within the water industry. 
 
The French model is quite different, and the following figure depicts it. 
 
 
Opposite to the English model, a strong local dimension based on the 
municipalities characterizes the French model. Municipalities have the 
power and responsibility of the water provision, and the economic 
regulation of private service provision is determined by the contract through 
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the municipality and the provider. There is not any national or regional 
independent regulator, and municipalities are the only responsible for the 
design of the contract with the water provider, in order to contract tariffs, 
adjustments and every other contingency. The only control on 
municipalities is made by the Ministry of Interior and by the National Audit 
Entity (Cour de Comptes) within the general auditing of expenditure and of 
the general financial equilibrium. The model is characterized by a weak 
power of the National Government. This power is also spread in many 
departments. In fact, the competence of general environmental regulation is 
of the Ministry of Ecology, while its National Office for Water and the 
Aquatic Environment (ONEMA) has the objective of developing knowledge 
and information about water resources and their uses. The control of the 
drinking water quality is in the competence of the Ministry of Health. 
Moreover, Six Water Agencies, controlled by the Ministry of Economy 
together with the Ministry of Ecology, collect fees directly from water users 
(householders or economic stakeholders) for any pollution they have caused 
or for the water they may have drawn. These funds are then reallocated in 
the form of financial loans or subsidies to local communities for investment 
in waster infrastructure.  
 
In Germany, the responsibility of the water provision is delegated to the 
municipalities, which design the water contract and negotiates directly with 
the water provider. Nevertheless, we have seen that the major part of cases 
the water provider is a fully public owned firm.  
In Germany, the model is structured on the base of the French one. A 
strong decentralized framework assigns to the local municipalities the 
provision of the water services. The Federal Government and the Stats 
(Laenders) states the legal framework, usually transporting EU legislation, 
thus influencing general condition of water services, water tariffs (e.g. for 
the principle of cost recovery), water quality and so on. 
 112
 
Moreover the Government use the power to control the expenditure of 
municipalities. Nevertheless, the central institution is the municipality, 
which have to decide on the institutional, organizational and contractual 
arrangements for the provision of water services. Drinking water quality is 
also monitored directly by municipalities. Like in France, there is no 
autonomous regulatory agency. Nevertheless, the national Antitrust Agency 
is competent, between other, on the tariff supervision, through a cost control 
and a comparison with other homogeneous companies. Municipalities are 
free to determine water tariffs, though Antitrust Agency may order a 
revision of the tariffs if an abuse of monopoly power is proven. In fact, 
water providers must be able to demonstrate that their water prices are not 
higher than those of comparable companies and suppliers. If the Antitrust 
Agency conducts an investigation due to suspicion of “misuse of pricing”, 
the technical standard and cost structures are closely examined and then 
compared to those of similar companies.  
 
The Italian regulatory structure, whose structure is depicted in the 
following figure, is a hybrid between the French and the UK model.  
Municipality 
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Contract/ 
Concession 
Contract
Water provider Antitrust 
Agency 
Federal 
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First of all, there is neither a strong decentralization, like as in France, 
nor a strong centralization, like as in England. An intermediate government 
level is the centre of the model. In fact, local municipality are obliged to 
joint in basin consortia, called AATOs, which are responsible for the water 
provision. The AATOs choices the organizational model and decide an 
investment plan to be realized. The contractual form is the concession. Like 
as in French, the AATOs design the concession contract, and, within the 
national and European legislation, negotiate the tariffs and other contractual 
clauses. The concession contract is the main regulatory tool, with AATOs 
acting as a local regulator. Unfortunately, every AATO has conflicting 
interests in making the regulator and the contractual party.  In fact, an 
independent regulator is not presence in the model. The only national body 
is the COVIRI, an office of the Ministry of Infrastructure. Among its main 
duties, there is the power to enact the broad formula for tariff determination 
and adjustment, which has afterwards to be spelled out in more detail in 
each contract signed by the AATOs. Regional Environment Agency 
Municipalities 
Concession 
Contract 
Water provider 
COVIRI 
Ministry  
of Infrastructure
AATO 
Regions 
(ASL)  Antitrust agency 
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(ASL)26 are responsible of the pollution control. Finally, as we have seen in 
the previous paragraph, the national Antitrust Agency may play a role in 
case of abuse of dominant position of water companies. 
 
4.4.2 The ownership structure 
In the chapter 2, we have seen that PPPs may be arranged in many different 
forms, depending on the type of involvement of the private sector in the 
various stages of the provision. Generally, if not organized with a fully 
public provision through a public firm, the recurrent forms of PPPs in the 
water sector are the concession or service contracts. It is often the case that 
the capital of the water company is mixed owned by public and private 
parties, creating a mixed capital firm. 
In order to shows the ownership structure of the capital of the water 
companies, the following figure depicts the percentage of population served 
by private regulated firms, mixed capital firms and public firms in the four 
countries analysed. 
England is the only country where the private sector entirely owns the 
water companies, and where the public sector owns no participation in the 
stage of provision. Also in France, private firms owns the large part of the 
water companies, which serve 80% of population, while public firms serve 
only the 20% of population. In Germany and in Italy, public firms 
principally provide water services, serving 87% and 58% of population 
respectively. However, while in Germany only a little part of population is 
served by some forms of PPPs, in Italy an important part of population 
(34%) is served by the IPPP in the form of the mixed regulated firm, and 
private firms serve only a marginal part (8%).   
 
 
 
                                                 
26 ASL is the acronym of Azienda Sanitaria Locale. 
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A different analysis has to be made with respect to the ownership of 
water assets. We have seen that water assets consist in treatment and storage 
plants, pumps and distributional networks. Generally, public authorities, 
such as municipalities or other local governments, maintain the ownership 
of these entire infrastructures. In the service and concession contracts public 
parties generally lease water assets to the water provider, which will give 
back them at the end of the contract. This is what happens in France, 
Germany and Italy. 
The case of England and Wales is the only in the world where water 
infrastructures are privately owned. In fact, the water companies, entirely 
privately owned and listed at the London Stock Exchange, are the owners of 
all infrastructures used to provide water services. On the other hand, the 
Department of Environment awarded a licence to every water company in 
order to supply water services in a certain geographical area. This licence, 
whose obligations are controlled by the Water Services Regulation 
England and Wales France 
100
%
20%
80%
 
Italy Germany 
58%
8%
34%
87%
4%
9%
 
Percentage of population served by public firms (grey colour), 
mixed firms (white colour) and private firms (black colour). 
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Authority (OFWAT), may end. Nevertheless, in the case the Department of 
Environment decide to terminate a licence, a minimum 25 years’ notice has 
to be given to the water company. In so doing, water companies have 
substantially a sort of indeterminate duration of their licence.   
 
4.4.3 Governmental levels involved and  their contractual power  
We have seen that in the four countries different levels of government are 
involved in the provision of water services. The levels of government of the 
water organization determine also the number of institutions involved and 
their degree of contractual power. The following table gives an idea of the 
degree of centralization/decentralization of the water organization of the 
four countries. 
Country  Accountability for the water service Number of water providers 
Germany  Municipality 6.000 
United Kingdom  National Government 23 
France  Municipality 14.900 
Italy  Consortium of municipalities (AATOs) 235 
 
Due to their decentralized organization, France and Germany base the 
service provision on the ability of their numerous municipalities, and have a 
high number of providers. The English model, based on a centralized 
national organization, is composed by only twenty three water companies. 
Finally, the Italian water system is an hybrid model, where an intermediate 
level of government is chosen, and with a relatively low number of service 
providers, with respect to the French and the German case.  
 
4.4.4 Tariff setting and the financing of water investment  
The general principle of the cost recovery of the water services is 
everywhere accepted, so no difference arises on this point between the four 
countries. Some differences arise on the way infrastructure are financed. In 
the determination of water tariffs generally a price cap regulation is used, 
that is some cases is an hybrid form.  
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In England and Wales each water company needs to collect sufficient 
revenue to finance its operating expenditure (C) and the capital investment 
programme (I). It also has to finance previous capital investment through 
the return of the company earns on its capital value (r). In addition, revenue 
has to cover also taxation costs (T). The sum of these costs is called revenue 
requirement (Rr).  
Rr = C + I + r + T. 
Tariffs limits are set in order to achieve a forecasted revenue (R), that 
ensures the revenue requirement plus a K factor:  
R = Rr + K. 
K includes price increasing due to inflation, measured by the retail price 
index (RPI) and an X factor that is an efficiency factor.  
K = RPI – X. 
OFWAT examines the scope for efficiency for every water company. 
Separate efficiency targets are set by the value X for each company for 
operating and capital expenditure.  In this way, tariffs should normally 
increase slower than the rate of inflation. Tariffs are calculated by OFWAT 
in advance every five years in the Periodic Review process. At each price 
review, Ofwat considers the operating costs and capital costs (capital 
maintenance) necessary for companies to maintain their assets. Though 
OFWAT aims to minimise uncertainty, there are two major methods of 
dealing with uncertainty in un-contracted contingencies between the 
Periodic Reviews: interim determinations and logging up and down 
mechanisms. A company is allowed to ask an interim determination to 
OFWAT in order to re-determine its tariffs limits between the periodical 
reviews if it faces higher costs or lower income in respect of certain 
specified circumstances than assumed at the last price review. A relevant 
change of circumstances can occur when a new or changed legal 
requirement arises, or in case of an increase in the number of customer 
opting for a free meter, or in case of a higher percentage of non-payment by 
householders with respect to the hypothesis. The logging up mechanism 
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allows changes in capital costs to be taken into account at the next price 
review for certain specified changes experienced by a company. The 
mechanism ensures that the periodic review reflects the actual 
circumstances faced by the companies. In this way, water companies are not 
residual claimant with respect to uncertainty, so the formula is not a pure 
price cap, but a hybrid form.   
Investments in water infrastructure are financed by water companies 
through the debt or through self-financing by revenues. No subsides are 
allowed from the national or the local governments.  
 
In Italy a hybrid price-cap, similar to the England case, is applied. Water 
tariffs are determined by the AATOs, the regional water consortia between 
the basin municipalities, applying the Normalized Method. The AATO 
determines, for the entire duration of the concession, operative costs, 
amortization costs and the return of the capital value. Amortization costs 
and the rate of remuneration of invested capital depend on the investment 
plan approved by the AATOs. A difference with the English system is that 
in Italy every three years a tariff review is undertaken with a balance 
between the actual and the forecasted revenue. 
 Like as in England, in the three years period, tariff limits insure the 
forecasted revenue plus the inflation rate and a K factor that is a price limit 
accorded by the AATOs and depending by efficiency goals. The existing 
formula envisages a revenue-cap mechanism in which efficiency gains 
should mainly occur in the operational costs, and are retained by the 
company for three years, until a comprehensive tariff rebate takes place. On 
the contrary, planned investment costs must be fully reimbursed and are 
remunerated at a fixed rate of 7 per cent. 
Apart form the periodical tariff review, the AATO may consider in every 
time the tariff revision in case of a significant deviation of operative costs 
and of revenue requirements due to non-contracted contingencies.  
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Also in Italy, investments are financed directly by the water provider, 
which can decide the recourse to debt o to self-financing. No subsides are 
allowed from the national or the local governments. Nevertheless, we have 
seen that the cost of investment is entirely reimbursed by the planned 
revenue. Finally, the Italian water tariff id determined with a hybrid 
mechanism, which refers to the revenue cap regulation for the operating 
stage, and to the rate of return regulation for investment to be carried out.  
 
In France, the major in each municipality determines water tariffs. In the 
case of direct management, water prices are defined annually according to a 
vote by the local council. In the case of delegated management, the tariff is 
negotiated between the municipality and the water provider for the duration 
of the contract. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, local 
municipalities have a substantial flexibility in setting their tariffs, which are 
in the most of cases negotiated with the water provider. In addition to the 
basic water price, tariffs include also a surcharge to finance the activities of 
the River Basin Agencies and other levies for other state agencies. In a lease 
contract, the provider generally collects a communal surtax on behalf of the 
municipality, which correspond to the investment to be made in the water 
network. In fact, in the French model, the service provider is not always 
responsible of the investment in water infrastructure. This occurs only in the 
case of concession contracts. In the case of service contract, the service 
provider is only responsible for the operating the current water services, 
while the municipality is responsible for new investment in water network 
and other infrastructure. In this case, the municipality has to raise funds 
through surtaxes added to the water bills, or through the recourse to debt or 
to national subsides.   
 
In Germany, water companies and municipalities are autonomous in their 
tariff calculation. A state tariff regulator or a central authority does not exist. 
Municipalities set water tariffs in case of public provision. In case of private 
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parties’ involvement, the tariff is negotiated in the concession contract. 
Nevertheless, the financing of investment is responsibility of the service 
provider only in the case of a concession contract. 
Water companies must be able to verify and demonstrate that their water 
prices are no higher than those of comparable companies are. In fact, though 
a national regulator is absent, the national Antitrust Agency has some power 
on the control of the tariffs. The antitrust agency may conduct an 
investigation due to suspicion of “misuse of pricing”. In this case, the 
technical standard and cost structures are closely examined and then 
compared to those of similar companies (which corresponds, in part, to Cost 
Benchmarking). This approach is essentially not different from countries 
with a central price regulation. Germany’s approach differs from these 
others, however, in that it uses no uniform formulas applied from a central 
agency, but instead considers each situation individually, which corresponds 
to Germany’s federal, decentralized structure.  
Water investment is predominantly financed through debt and user fees. 
Commercial debt is issued directly by the municipalities in the form of 
municipal bonds or by utilities. According to the professional associations 
of the sector, there is no investment backlog. In fact, water losses in the 
distribution network have been estimated at only 7 percent in 2001, down 
from 11 percent in 1991. According to a study commissioned by the BGW 
losses are 19 percent in England/Wales, 26 percent in France and 29 percent 
in Italy. These would not only be the lowest water losses in the four 
countries, but also in the world. 
The following table shows a comparison of water tariffs between the four 
countries.27 
                                                 
27 The survey is based on prices as of 1 July 2008 for a consumer with an annual usage of 
10,000 cubic meters. All prices are in US cents per cubic meter and exclude VAT. Where 
there is more than a single supplier, an unweighted average of available prices was used. 
The percentage change is calculated using the local currency in order to eliminate currency 
movement distortion. 
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Country  Cost (US$)/m³ 
2006/2007 
Change  
5 Year Trend 
(2003/2008)  
Germany  3.01  +1.6%  +4.4%  
United Kingdom  2.37  +6.5%  +48.2%  
France  1.99  +0.2%  +13.8%  
Italy  1.57  +4.7%  +35.4%  
Source: NUS Consulting Group (2008) 
 
We have seen that the two opposite models are the English and the 
French model. In terms of risks bored by the service providers, the main 
differences are the following. 
 In the English model the ownership of the assets is of private water 
companies listed in the stock market. The private companies bore operative 
and investment risks, and they have to respect service standards imposed by 
an independent regulator (OFWAT). Demand risk is lower, because the 
private companies can obtain an increase of the tariffs in case of a high 
reduction of demand. A certain risk occurs every five years, with the price 
review determined by OFWAT. Nevertheless, OFWAT is constrained in 
guaranteeing economic and financial equilibrium of the private companies 
and a certain remuneration of the private investment.  
In the France model, the private sector bears operative risk and part of 
the demand risk, while investment risk is shared with public party. In this 
context, private sector bears only a part of the total risk, while the 
municipalities bore the large part. Moreover, due to the strong 
decentralization towards municipalities, these local governments actually 
bore more risk then what seems, due to their small contractual power with 
respect to private multinationals.  
The German model is a hybrid, similar to the French one in the strong 
decentralization towards municipalities; on the other hand, the risk is largely 
bored by the public party, which is the prevalent operator of the sector, 
leaving little room to the private sector. In fact, the tariff has to cover the 
entire cost of the service, included the investment cost.  
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A hybrid form is present also in Italy. In this case a more room is left to 
the public-private partnership in the form of mixed capital firm, where 
operative and investment risk are bored by private and public parties. 
However, a revision of tariffs is possible in case of increasing in costs or in 
decreasing of demand.  
 
4.5 THE PUBBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE WATER 
SECTOR: AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING APPROACH. 
In the previous section, we have analysed the main features of the water 
sector, and we have provided a comparison of the different water systems in 
the most important countries of the European Union.  
In general, in order to provide water services, a government enter in a 
PPP without an economic analysis that shows the effects of this choice on 
social welfare. The main arguments in favour of a PPP are the following.  
1) The PPP ensures water quality and achieve regulatory compliance. 
According to this view, private partners have a powerful incentive to 
increase the quality of the services provided, in order to secure new 
contracts and increase their revenues.  
2) A second argument is the technical expertise ensured by private 
partners, which focus their businesses on the operation and maintenance of 
water facilities.  
3) The third argument is the operative efficiency. The technical 
experience of the private partner can translate into a more productive 
efficiency of a PPP with respect to a pure public provision from a cost 
perspective, allowing municipalities mitigate increases in water tariffs. 
4) The last argument is that a PPP is able to raise private finance in order 
to invest into the high capital-intensive infrastructure of the water system. 
On the first point, the fact that private partners have a high incentive to 
increase the quality of the services provided, in order to secure new 
contracts, is not confirmed by the experiences analyzed in the previous 
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section. In fact, the problem is that the water sector is a particular case, with 
a generally saturated market, where there is a very little room for new 
contracts and new consumers. The consequence is that private partner may 
have a low incentive to improve the quality of the service provided, and this 
is the opposite of the government’s aims.  
On the fourth point, in the previous section we have seen that in the water 
sector the role of the private partner is not to raise funds. In fact, the cost of 
the service is always financed by revenue collected by final consumers, and 
the investment cost is also financed by debt or it is self-financed by revenue 
collected by final consumers and/or by public subsidies. In fact, we have 
seen that in Italy consumers finance investment costs through water tariffs, 
and no State subside is allowed. The same case occurs in England and in 
Germany, where investment are financed by the water tariffs charged to 
consumers. Only the case of France allows, in some cases, investment 
financed by local authorities. We have seen that in Latin American countries 
investment are often financed by the World Bank, with a guarantee of the 
local governments, which bore the entire risk of insolvency. In every case, 
private parties does not provide funds in order to invest in the water 
infrastructure. On the other hand, in particular within the European Union, 
the role of the PPPs may be linked to the possibility of shifting the high 
investment costs out of the governmental accountancy, in order to overcome 
balance constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact, as we have 
seen in the chapter 2.   
The argument two and three do not explain the reason why the private 
partner is superior to its public partner in experience and in productive 
efficiency. These arguments are exogenously given, while an endogenous 
reason should be better to clarify the difference in the relative performances. 
In other words, the reason of the superiority in technical expertise and in 
productive efficiency of a private partnership with respect to a pure public 
supply is not clear. Moreover, we have seen that also econometric analyses 
are far from give an unambiguous result.   
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In this framework, the differences between the PPPs and the more 
traditional forms of water provision have to be explained in an endogenous 
way. In other words, the superiority of one organizational form with respect 
to another is linked to the parties’ incentive to invest in the relationship or to 
deviate towards opportunistic behaviours.   
Due to the specific features of the water sector, the service provider has 
to face a number of risks during the long-term relationship. In fact, we have 
seen that the water sector is characterized by high specific and fixed in place 
investment. They require high specialization, the ability to finance such 
investment and the ability to maintain the long-term financial equilibrium 
between costs and revenues. Water infrastructure requires a long 
amortization period, so the provider has to be able to repay the long-term 
loans used to finance the planned investment. Moreover, the provider has to 
consider the risk that construction costs exceed expectations, with respect to 
the initial planned investment. Finally, the provider has to face also a 
political risk, due to the possible political instability and the change of 
regulation with respect to the beginning of the relationship.  
On the other hand, the provider is awarded to operate under monopoly 
conditions, with no competitors, and this may be a source of high market 
power.  
The principle of optimal allocation of risk states that the party best able 
to manage it at the least cost should handle the risk, and higher risks need to 
be balanced against higher returns. Unfortunately, in practice in the water 
sector it is very difficult to write a complete contract where all risks are 
clearly allocated to each contractual party. In the water contracts, it is not 
always clear who should manage the risk, and risk allocation may be more 
the result of ex post bargaining and negotiation than the result of an optimal 
allocation.  
Contractual incompleteness is in fact one of the most important feature 
which characterizes contractual relationships in the water sector.  
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The other peculiar feature is the presence of asymmetric information 
about the quality of infrastructure. In the chapter 3, we have seen that 
economic theory suggests that a local government (the principal) may be 
privately informed about the quality of the infrastructure that a potential 
service provider (the agent) will use. According to Martimort-Sand-
Zantman (2006) this is the case of the water sector. In fact, water 
infrastructure have been often built and operated in the past by local 
municipalities, which own private knowledge about the quality of the 
existing assets. A municipality may know the declining status of existing 
pumps, water pipes and distribution networks. The authors suggest that in 
case of high quality infrastructure, public ownership is more likely the 
organizational form, under the assumption of a risk neutral local 
government. On the other hand, in case of low quality infrastructure and risk 
averse local governments, it is more likely the involvement of private 
parties, and the engagement of a form of PPP. According to this view, the 
prevalence in the north of Italy of the in-house organizational form should 
mean a high probability of a good quality water infrastructure in that region, 
different from the region of south, where the involvement of private parties 
implies that the quality of infrastructure is probably bad. In addition, the 
English case shows that private involvement occurred because of the bad 
quality of infrastructure, caused by year and years of underinvestment by 
the public water authorities.  
Nevertheless, the presence of the in-house organizational forms are not 
only the consequence of the quality of infrastructure. The choice of the in-
house form may be also the consequence of rent-seeking lobbies trying to 
get subsides, of self-interested politicians struggling for power or for a large 
share of electoral vote. In this case, the in-house public firm is affected by 
all inefficiencies characterizing the public sector.  
If the presence of public parties may be the cause of productive 
inefficiencies, the presence of private parties may generate a market power.  
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In this section, we use an incomplete contracting approach in order to 
understand the role of the PPPs in developing water services and the effects 
of different ownership structures on parties’ incentive to invest in the 
relationship.  
The experiences analysed in the previous section reveal that, of the 
organizational forms analysed in the chapter 2, the most used for the water 
provision are the following: 
the in-house model, that is the delegation to a the fully public firm;  
the contractual PPP, in the form of a concession contract to a fully 
private firm;  
the institutional PPP, that is the creation of a mixed capital firm, with the 
partnership capital owned by public and private parties.  
In each case, the public party engages a long-term contract with the 
provider, due to the need of diluting in the time the amortization of high 
intensive capital investment. The experience shows that the duration of a 
water contract varies from fifteen to twenty five/thirty years.    
If the public party would be able to sign a complete contract, the 
organizational form would not be a matter, and the same result could be 
achieved in each case. The consequence is that, if a difference exists 
between different organizational forms, this is due to the presence of 
contractual incompleteness.  
Therefore, in order to understand the costs and benefits of the previous 
three organizational forms, we assume that contracts are incomplete, and 
residual rights of controls in un-contracted circumstances are important in 
determining parties’ incentives.  
 
4.5.1 Contractual incompleteness in the water sector 
In the water sector, a complete contract should describe all parties’ 
obligations in every contingency, and it should impose high penalties in 
case of not respected contractual clauses. It is worth notice that in some 
areas, the contract may easily describe many aspects of the water provision. 
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In fact, the previous chapter shows that the quality of the current activities 
of delivering water to consumers may be easy to describe. For example, it 
may be easy to define the waiting time for the installation of a new water 
meter, the chemical parameter of the water (as analysed by an independent 
laboratory), the speed of the administrative activities.  
Nevertheless, we consider that in two crucial areas incompleteness arises: 
the activities of building new infrastructure and the activities of 
maintenance of the existing water infrastructure.  
In fact, in the activities of construction of new infrastructure, the contract 
should provide a detailed description of each water plant and distribution 
network to build from the first to the last year of the a long-term contract, 
specifying the location, the detailed draw of the network and the cost of 
building each plant. Moreover, the contract should specify the variation in 
the water tariff for every change in the investment plan proposed by the 
public party. It should specify the effects, during the relationships, of the 
variations of building material costs, it should specify the delivery day for 
every plant, and the contractual variation in every contingency. It should 
specify the contractual variation in every change of the environmental law, 
or in every case of climatic changes, or in every other possible contingency. 
Moreover, it should specify in detail every maintenance activity of the 
water infrastructure, for every year of the contract and for every plant. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to sign such a detailed contract, because it is 
impossible to foresee all future contingencies that could occur in a so long 
period of time. Some variables are too difficult to specify in advance and 
without ambiguity. Moreover, many variables are non-verifiable by a court, 
which is not able to enforce the contract. In particular, as assumed by the 
theorists of incomplete contracting, the increase in the value of material 
assets is not verifiable. In fact, for a judge it is not sufficient to observe the 
amount of monetary expenses bored by the provider, because it can also use 
money in a wrong way.  
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The issues of contractual incompleteness are made worse by the presence 
of informational problems about the quality of infrastructure. We have seen 
that public parties may have an informational advantage about the actual 
state of infrastructure. Nevertheless, this aspect may be a cause of 
renegotiation of the contract, because in the most cases the determination of 
water tariffs is linked to the amount of investment to be realized. On tha 
other hand, it may be the case that also the public party may be not perfectly 
informed about the actual quality of its water infrastructure. In fact, due to 
the  technical features of the sector, the physical assessment of the actual 
state of water assets is extremely costly, so a small and poor local 
municipality may have no resources to finance such activity.  
Moreover, according to Bajari-Tadelis (2001), the descriptive 
engineering suggests that either the contractor or the pubic authority has 
private information at the initial stage of a public project. They both, 
however, share uncertainty about many important design changes that occur 
after the contract is signed and construction begins, such as design failures, 
unanticipated site and environmental conditions, and changes in regulatory 
requirements. These observations suggest that in this case the problem is 
primarily one of ex post adaptations rather than ex ante screening. 
The issues of contractual incompleteness in the areas of construction and 
maintenance of water assets are shown by the experiences analysed. In the 
case of Italy, COVIRI (2008) shows that the investment plans attached to 
the concession contracts signed by AATOs are often not clear and well 
defined. Investment plans in general report only the total annual amount of 
the planned investment, but it is absent a clear description of each single 
plant to realize and the amount of investment of each single plant. The 
business plans are never detailed in the specification of the current activities 
to realise, and they never describe the maintenance activity to realize in 
order to preserve the value of the existing assets. Moreover, databases are 
not always reliable, and a demographic and economic analysis is not always 
present.  
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Due to the fact that the contract is incomplete, it will be renegotiated 
every time during the long-term relationship. For this reason, according to 
an incomplete contracting approach, the contract may be view as a 
background, a starting point for a renegotiation stage rather than a tool able 
to specify a final output.  
In fact, the experiences show that renegotiation is a frequent activity in 
the water service long-term relationships.  
First, we have seen that each country applies a hybrid form of revenue 
cap regulation, due to the presence of a renegotiation step of the initial 
conditions in case of not-contracted contingencies. For example, in England, 
apart from the periodical tariff review, a so-called interim determination 
allows a private company to ask a re-determination of its tariffs limits in 
case of higher costs or lower income in respect of the initial circumstances. 
The case of Italy shows that, a part the periodical review, in every time a 
tariff revision is possible in case of a significant deviation of operative costs 
and of revenue requirements due to non-contracted contingencies. In the 
case of France and Germany, the municipalities are autonomous in their 
choice of water tariffs, with are negotiated and renegotiated every time with 
the service providers.  
Second, the number of renegotiations in the water contract is effectively 
very high. Guasch-Laffont-Straub (2003) show that in Latin American 
countries, during the 1990s, on a sample of 89 water contracts, 63 were 
renegotiated (70.8%). According to the authors, one of the main 
determinants of renegotiations is incompleteness of contracts28. In the 
French case, private providers always renegotiate water tariffs, and, in some 
cases, the municipalities, which do not want to renegotiate the contract, 
                                                 
28 According to Guasch-Laffont-Straub (2003), apart form contractual incompleteness, 
there are also other factors which explain water contract renegotiations. There are political 
cycle considerations (the government expropriating the contractor), and the ability of the 
regulator to impose the implementation of the agreed contract.  
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prefer to return to the direct management29.  In Italy, though the water 
reform is still at its initial stage, many cases of renegotiation of water 
contract have just occurred. For example, the only case of Acea, which we 
have seen in the previous sections, shows that in some ATOs a renegotiation 
of water tariffs have occurred after less than three years from the beginning 
of the contract. In fact, from the reading of Acea’s Group Balance Sheet for 
the year 2007, we can notice that a renegotiation of water tariffs have 
occurred in the ATOs of Frosinone and of Ombrone.  
 
4.5.2 An analyses of different organizational forms 
In this section, we adopt the perspective of incomplete contracts, within 
the spirit of the works of Hart-Shleifer-Vishny (1997), Hart (2003) and 
Bennet-Iossa (2006), in order to understand the performance of different 
organizational forms. In particular, we analyse the case of an istitutional 
PPP (that is a mixed capital firm, owned by public and private parties), with 
respect to the traditional form of the in-house provision (through a fully 
public firms) and to the concession to a fully private regulated firm. The 
idea is that the fundamental difference between public, mixed and private 
firms concerns the allocation of residual control rights.  
A public entity has to organize its water sector. Due to the conditions of 
natural monopoly, one possibility is to create an own fully public firms, 
which manages the entire water system. Another way is to engage in a PPP, 
in order to involve private partners. We assume that, considering the forms 
of PPP of section 2, the public entity is interested to a concession contract to 
a fully private regulated firm or to the creation of a mixed capital firm.  
In any case, the public entity has to sign a contract in order to engage a 
long-term relationship with the water provider. The contract is characterized 
by a long duration, by an investment plan to be realized during the 
relationship and by the provision of the water services. Water assets will 
                                                 
29 In June 2008, the major of Paris announced that when the contract with SUEZ and Veolia 
will expire in 2009, the water system will return to public management. 
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come back to the public entity at the end of the contract. The provider will 
collect revenue directly from the consumers, applying a water tariff as 
defined in the contract. The assumption is that the initial contract, called 
“basic contract”, is able to describe only some aspects of the long-term 
relationship. In fact, due to the presence of contractual incompleteness 
analysed in the previous paragraph, it is impossible to write a complete 
contract that describes ex ante all contingencies. Instead, the parties revise 
the basic contract ex post. In this case, we refer to a “modified contract”.   
In each case, the firm is conducted by a manager, which may exert two 
types of effort. The first type is an effort in cost reducing activity, which we 
assume that leads to a reduction in operative costs but is accompanied by a 
reduction in the quality of the service provided. A second effort may be 
directed to a quality enhancing activity, which increases the quality of the 
water assets in the building stage of planned investment. The important 
assumption is that manager’s efforts are non-contractible, because they are 
not verifiable by a third party, such as a court, and hence they cannot be 
enforced. Moreover, every effort can be made without violating the basic 
contract. In fact, the basic contract is an incomplete contract, so these 
activities do not violate it. In particular, the cost reducing activity lead to a 
reduction in operative costs, nevertheless it is accompanied by a reduction 
in the quality, which may regard the quality of water assets, because of a 
reduced effort in the maintenance activity. The quality enhancing activity 
leads to an increase in the quality of the water assets in the building stage of 
planned investment. Due to the contractual incompleteness about a long-
term investment plan, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, this effort 
is devoted to enhance the quality of investment also in presence of non-
contracted contingencies and of technical issues. 
The assumption is that the manager bores a cost in making efforts, so he 
is stimulated in these activities only if he can share part of the benefits 
deriving form these efforts.   
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In the case of a fully public firm, a public manager, appointed by the 
local government, operates the firm. The assumption is that the public 
manager does not implement any effort, because he does not benefit of any 
surplus deriving from this activity. In this case, inefficiencies arise by the 
fact that any cost reducing activity and any quality enhancing activity are 
made. In fact, the public entity, that is the owner of residual control rights, 
extracts all surplus deriving from the manager’s efforts, and this fact 
determines no incentive to the manager in making efforts. On the other 
hand, in this case the absence of cost reducing activities is a good news, 
because maintenance activities are not cut, and existing assets are not 
depreciated. 
 
In the case of fully private firm, the firm is operated by a private 
manager, which is appointed by the private party. The assumption is that 
private party both owns the firm and manages it, and there is no separation 
between ownership and control. In this case, because the private party owns 
the residual control rights on assets, he exerts a strong effort towards the 
cost reducing activity, without considering the negative effects of such 
activity on the maintenance activities. On the other, no effort in quality 
enhancing activity is made. In fact, in this case, no surplus comes back to 
the private party, because this activity enhance the value of assets, which go 
back to the public party at the end of the contract. In case of renegotiation, 
the public party may offer to the private some of the surplus deriving from 
the quality enhancing activity. In this case, an effort in such activity is made 
within the limits of the surplus recognized by the public party in the 
renegotiation stage. 
Because the private party ignores the deterioration of assets deriving 
from the cost reducing activity, there is an exaggeration on this activity. On 
the other hand, an effort in quality enhancing activity is made, even though 
within the limits of the surplus deriving from the renegotiation stage.  
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In the case of a mixed capital firm, the partnership capital is owned by 
public and private parties. We assume that the public entity retains the major 
part of the firm capital, while the firm is operated by a manager appointed 
by the private party, which exerts efforts. As in the private case, we assume 
that there is no separation between ownership and control, so private party 
benefits of the manager’s wage and of the firm profit. In this case, the profit 
is shared by public and private party. 
In this case, private party exerts a cost reducing activity. However, due to 
the fact that the major profit deriving from this effort has to be shared with 
the public partner, this activity is not exacerbated, so the maintenance 
activity is not cut and the value of assets is not depreciated. On the other 
hand, public and private parties engage a renegotiation on the surplus 
deriving from the quality enhancing activity, and the private party exerts an 
effort in such activity within the limits of the surplus recognized to him in 
the renegotiation stage.  
This case shows that the institutional PPPs, in the form of a mixed capital 
firm, may be able to achieve more satisfactory results than a fully public 
firm and a fully private regulated firm. In fact, a mixed capital firm devotes 
more effort toward a fully public firm in the quality enhancing activity. In 
fact, the presence of private parties is able to reduce or to eliminate the 
problem of expropriation of managerial effort made by the public party. On 
the other hand, in order to achieve productive efficiency, an effort in the 
cost reducing activity is made higher than a fully public firm. Nevertheless, 
differing form a fully private firms, this activity is not exacerbated, so the 
maintenance activity is not cut, and the value of water assets is not 
depreciated.  
The optimal choice of the organizational form is not given, because it 
depends on the importance that the activities of quality enhancing and of 
cost reducing may have in every sector. In a competitive market, where 
there is not the delegation of building infrastructure and with no problem of 
natural monopoly, the cost reducing activities perhaps would have been 
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most important and with no negative externalities. In this case, a fully 
private firm would have been the optimal organizational form, with its 
strong activity of cost cutting.  
The water sector, instead, is very peculiar, and it is important the quality 
of infrastructure, which is a good that, in the long term, is owned by the 
public sector and must not be depreciated. In this case, the presence of a 
private partner makes possible higher efficiency than a public firm; 
nevertheless, the presence of the public party is important in avoiding the 
pressure on cost cutting of the private parties and in renegotiating 
contractual clauses in order to stimulate the quality in building 
infrastructure. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
With the development of the PPPs in the water sector in the last years, a 
number of slogans circulate on the water as a public good, as a fundamental 
right, an essential resource, and on the necessity that it must remain within 
the public sector. However, what means that the private sector is involved in 
the water sector? Initially, we have to clear the field by a misunderstanding. 
The private sector is not involved in the property of the water resources. 
They are surely in the public hands. Nevertheless, a different thing is the 
provision of water services, which deals with the distribution of the water 
through specific infrastructure. In this field, the private sector may inject its 
market orientation and its entrepreneurial vision, in order to achieve 
productive efficiency. Nevertheless, the monopolistic nature of the water 
sector, where no alternative forms of market competition are feasible, 
generates a worry of creating a private monopoly. The English case shows 
that private firms, due to their market power, are largely devoted to 
activities of cost cutting. The consequence is that this activity has negative 
effects of the quality of water infrastructure. 
On the other hand, the public sector is no more efficient than the private 
sector. Experience shows that the public sector is however sensible to 
lobbies trying to get subsides, or to self-interested politicians struggling for 
power or for a large share of electoral vote.  
In this context, a role for the PPPs arises. In fact, the involvement of 
private and public parties may be the way to achieve a solution which 
collects the benefits of each party. In this case, the presence of a private 
partner makes possible a productive efficiency higher than a public firm. 
Nevertheless, the presence of the public party is important in avoiding the 
pressure on cost cutting of the private parties in those activities important in 
the maintenance of the quality of water infrastructure. Moreover, public 
party is important also in renegotiating contractual clauses in order to 
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concede to the private one part of the benefits deriving from the activity of 
enhancing the quality in building infrastructure.  
Finally, two considerations have to be made.  
First, it is important the governmental levels involved in the contractual 
relationship, because the magnitude of the public authority influences its 
contractual power. The PPP has to be managed by public and private parties 
with a well balanced contractual power. Unfortunately, in many cases, 
public parties may be in a weaker position than the private counterpart in the 
renegotiation stage, because of a lower contractual power. In fact, small and 
poorly diversified municipalities are not able to manage complex and 
multimillionaire contracts with large private multinational companies, 
which have a high contractual power. This is what happens in many cases in 
the French model. Nevertheless, also the Italian case shows that the public 
authority should be organized at a regional level, because municipalities are 
always small and not able to manage the complexity of a water contract.  
Second, the water system needs an autonomous and independent 
regulator agency, which can arbitrate the renegotiation of water contracts 
and balance the parties’ contractual power. The case of Italy presents a 
water regulator, the COVIRI, with a very little power. In fact, the 
renegotiation stage occurs directly between the AATOs and the service 
providers. Nevertheless, the AATOs maintain the function of regulator and 
of contractor, with a clear conflict of interest.  An independent regulator 
would be able to avoid such conflicts of and to arbitrate the renegotiation of 
the contract.  
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